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ABSTRACT
Arshad, Muhammad PhD, Purdue University, December 2016. Privacy, Access Con-
trol, and Integrity for Large Graph Databases. Major Professors: Arif Ghafoor and
Krishna Madhavan.
Graph data are extensively utilized in social networks, collaboration networks, geo-social
networks, and communication networks. Their growing usage in cyberspaces poses daunting
security and privacy challenges. Data publication requires privacy-protection mechanisms
to guard against information breaches. In addition, access control mechanisms can be used
to allow controlled sharing of data. Provision of privacy-protection, access control, and
data integrity for graph data require a holistic approach for data management and secure
query processing. This thesis presents such an approach. In particular, the thesis addresses
two notable challenges for graph databases, which are: i) how to ensure users’ privacy in
published graph data under an access control policy enforcement, and ii) how to verify the
integrity and query results of graph datasets.
To address the first challenge, a privacy-protection framework under role-based access
control (RBAC) policy constraints is proposed. The design of such a framework poses
a trade-o↵ problem, which is proved to be NP-complete. Novel heuristic solutions are
provided to solve the constraint problem. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
scheme that studies the trade-o↵ between RBAC policy constraints and privacy-protection
for graph data. To address the second challenge, a cryptographic security model based on
Hash Message Authentic Codes (HMACs) is proposed. The model ensures integrity and
completeness verification of data and query results under both two-party and third-party
data distribution environments. Unique solutions based on HMACs for integrity verification
of graph data are developed and detailed security analysis is provided for the proposed





Graph data has become increasingly important in recent years because of its
widespread use in various applications. Some leading examples are online social net-
works (OSN), Web, collaboration networks, and communication networks [1]. The
nodes of a graph represent entities, while their connections capture various relation-
ships among them. The semantics assigned with nodes and links in the graph data
vary significantly across application domains. For example, a social network is usu-
ally represented by a set of users, where links may capture friendship relationships; a
co-authorship network, on the other hand, describes scientific publications and their
collaboration links, etc.
The analysis of published graph data is used extensively by researchers in di↵erent
disciplines to extract useful knowledge and information. For example, epidemiologists
study disease spread patterns based on users’ social contact information; sociologists
and psychologists can verify the social structure and human behavior pattern; mining
algorithms are used to discover various patterns in these graphs; and advertisers can
accurately infer users’ preference profiles for targeted advertisements [2], [3]. This
data is published to stakeholders and authorized users.
Due to strong correlation among users’ social identities, privacy poses a major
challenge in data storage, processing, and publishing. The sensitive nature of data
raises privacy challenges as users’ private information may be revealed in published
graph data [4]. Privacy-preservation for sensitive data entails enforcement of privacy
policies and the provision for su cient protection against identity disclosure [5].
Data anonymization has been studied extensively and adopted widely for pro-
tecting users’ privacy in graph data publishing [2], [3]. Simply removing the node
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identifiers in social networks does not provide protection against structure-based re-
identification attacks [4]. Backstorm et al. [4] present a family of active and passive
attacks that work based on the uniqueness of some small random subgraphs embedded
in a network. The adversary may link this distinctive structure, random subgraph, to
some set of targeted individuals. In the anonymized published graph, the adversary
then traces the injected subgraph in the original graph. In case of only one such sub-
graph in the original graph, the targets that are connected to this subgraph can be
successfully re-identified and the edges between them are disclosed. In [6], Narayanan
et al. present a scalable two-phase de-anonymization (DA) process for social networks.
In the first phase, some seed nodes are identified between the anonymized and aux-
iliary graphs. In the second phase, the identified seed nodes are used in an iterative
DA propagation process based on both graphs’ structural characteristics. A detailed
comparison of di↵erent protection schemes against de-anonymization attacks is given
in [7].
Due to the high cost of hosting large volumes of data and performing data-intensive
computations, the owners of graph databases often outsource their data to a third-
party service provider [8] that o↵ers data services on behalf of the data owners [9].
Generally, outsourcing also o↵ers performance-oriented and scalable data services [10].
A leading example is the cloud computing paradigm. Other examples include Amazon
EC2, Amazon AWS, Google Cloud Service, and “Database-as-a-Service” [8], [10],
[11].
However, data outsourcing can pose serious data security challenges. The biggest
challenge is to ensure integrity of the data in the presence of untrusted service
providers [8], [9], [12]. Any tampering with data or query results presented to a
user can be perceived by the user as a violation of the Quality of Service (QoS) [13]
integrity requirements. However, verifying the integrity of graph data poses a signif-
icant security challenge [14].
3
1.2 Research Contributions
In this dissertation, we address the aforementioned challenges of privacy, access
control, and data integrity for graph datasets. In particular, we make two main
research contributions.
A privacy mechanism for access-controlled graph databases: A framework
for privacy-enhanced access-controlled graph dataset is presented. The framework
provides privacy protection through k-anonymization under the access restrictions
imposed by the RBAC policy. The k-anonymous bi-objective graph partitioning (k-
BGP) problem is formulated and hardness results are presented. E cient heuristics
have been developed to solve the problem. A detailed security analysis of the scheme
is conducted and the proposed algorithms has been empirically evaluated.
Integrity verification of data and query results for graph databases:
Two security notions – HMACs for graphs for two-party data sharing, and redactable
HMACs for graphs for third-party data sharing are developed. The proposed schemes
can support “fail-stop” and “fail-warn” integrity assurance (Section 4.2.4) mecha-
nisms that can result in substantial saving in the cost incurred for integrity verification
and data re-transfer of compromised graphs. Formal definitions and constructions of
HMACs for graphs and redactable HMACs for graphs are provided. The proposed
schemes are shown to be secure to protect the graphs and redacted graphs from being
compromised. Experimental results on real-world graph datasets demonstrate that
HMACs for graphs and redactable HMACs graphs are highly e cient compared to
digital signature-based schemes for graphs and the proposed schemes are linear in the
number of vertices and edges in the graph. Therefore, the proposed schemes are e -
cient both in processing time and in the transmission of result set R and verification
objects VO to the client/user.
4
1.3 Organization
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows:
In Chapter 2, relevant background concepts related to privacy, role-based access
control (RBAC), and Hash Message Authentication Codes (HMACs) are introduced.
In Chapter 3, a framework for privacy-preserving access-controlled graph datasets
is presented. Privacy and access constraints are formulated as the k-anonymous
bi-objective graph partitioning (k-BGP) problem. Hardness results are presented
and empirical evaluation is conducted for the proposed heuristics. In Chapter 4,
the problem of graph data and query results integrity verification using HMACs is
investigated. E cient integrity verification schemes are proposed. A detailed security
analysis of schemes is presented along with empirical evaluation on real-world graph
datasets. Chapter 5 concludes the dissertation with suggestions for future work.
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2. BACKGROUND
2.1 The Data Model
We consider a simple undirected graph data model, G = (V,E), where V =





is the set of edges1. Each node
corresponds to an individual in the underlying group of people, while an edge that
connects two nodes describes a relationship between two corresponding individuals.
In addition to the structural data that is given by E, each node is described by
a set of attributes (descriptive data) that can be classified in the following three
categories:
• Identifier. Attributes, e.g., name and ssn, that uniquely identify an entity.
These attributes are completely removed from an anonymized graph.
• Quasi-identifier (QI). Attributes, e.g., birth date, zip code and gender, that can
be joined with external information available to some adversary to reveal the
personal identity of an individual.
• Sensitive attribute. Attributes, e.g., disease and income, that are assumed to
be unknown to an intruder. They are assumed to cause a privacy breach if
associated to a unique individual.
The combination of QIs could be used for unique identification by mean of linking
attacks [15]. Hence, they should be generalized in order to thwart such attacks.
Definition 2.1.1 Let A1, A2, . . . , Ad be a collection of QI attributes. Then a graph










denotes the set of all unordered pairs of elements from V .
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Table 2.1.: Generalization for k anonymity
QI1 QI2 S1
ID Age Zip Income
1 10 25 120,000
2 20 35 95,000
3 30 45 110,000
4 35 15 150,000
5 40 40 290,000
6 50 60 75,000
7 55 20 225,000
8 60 55 350,000
9 65 25 175,000












(b) 2-anonymous table T
describing relationships between V pairs, and T = {T1, . . . , TN}, where Ti 2 A1 ⇥
. . .⇥ Ad, 1  i  N are the descriptive data associated with nodes in V .
2.2 Graph Anonymization Definitions
Consider the anonymization of a given graph G = hV,E, T i by partitioning as
given in [16], [17], [18]. Let VP = P = {P1, . . . , PM} be a partition of V into
disjoint subsets or partitions, i.e., V =
SM






be a set of edges on VP , where {Pi, Pj} 2 EP i↵ there exists vn 2 Pi
and vm 2 Pj such that {vn, vm} 2 E.
Definition 2.2.1 (k-Anonymity Property) A graph satisfies the k-anonymity prop-
erty if each partition Pi 2 P contains k or more nodes [16].
Definition 2.2.2 (Super-node) In the anonymized published graph (e.g., Fig. 3.1(b)),
each partition, say Pi 2 P, is replaced by a pair of items, (|Pi|, |EPi |), 1  i  M ,
where |Pi| is the number of nodes in a particular partition (i.e., the number of original
V -nodes as part of that partition), and |EPi | is the number of edges in E that connect
nodes within Partition Pi, 1  i M . This new published node is termed super-node.
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Definition 2.2.3 (Super-edge) In the anonymized published graph (e.g., Fig. 3.1(b)),
each edge, say (Pi, Pj) 2 EP , is labeled by a weight |EPi,Pj |, which stands for the num-
ber of edges in E that connect a node in Pi to a node in Pj. This new published edge
is termed a super-edge.
We assume that all the QI attributes have numerical values and use the hierarchical-
free generalization [19] that generalizes the set of tuples present in a partition, say Pi,
with the smallest interval that includes all the initial values, also called the minimal
covering tuple, for that partition.
Definition 2.2.4 (Anonymized graph [16]) Let G = hV,E, T i be a graph with
vertex attributes, and let A1, . . . , Ad be the generalization taxonomies for d QI at-
tributes A1, . . . , Ad. Then, given a partitioning VP of V , the anonymized graph is






is a set of edges on VP , where {Pi, Pj} 2 EP i↵ there exists vn 2 Pi
and vm 2 Pj such that {vn, vm} 2 E;
• The partitions in VP are labeled by their sizes and the number of their intra-
cluster edges (|Pi|, |EPi |), while the edges in EP are labeled by the corresponding
number of inter-cluster edges, |EPiPj |, in E where 1  i 6= j M ;
• T = {T 1, . . . , TM}, where T i is the minimal record in A1 ⇥ . . . ⇥ Ad that gen-
eralizes all QI tuples of individuals in Pi, 1  i  M . Table 2.1(b) shows a
2-anonymous partitioning for a dataset with QI attributes Age and Zip.
2.3 Role-based Access Control
Role-based access control (RBAC) allows defining permissions on objects based on
roles in an organization. An RBAC policy configuration is composed of a set of Users
(U), a set of Roles (R), and a set of Permissions (P). For the graph model, we assume
that the set of permissions for a role are the selection predicates on the QI attributes
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Table 2.2.: Access control policy
Role Permission Authorized Query Predicate (View)
Role1 X Age = 15-45 ^ Zip = 20-30
Role2 Y Age = 30-45 ^ Zip = 25-45
Role3 Z Age = 50-60 ^ Zip = 55-60
that the role is authorized to execute [20]. Among the authorized tuple subset, a
user is free to set any selection condition on the sensitive attribute. The user-to-
role assignment (UA) is a user-to-role (U ⇥R) mapping and the role-to-permission
assignment (PA) is a role-to-permission (R⇥ P) mapping.
Definition 2.3.1 (RBAC Policy) An RBAC policy ⇢ is a tuple hU ,R,P , UA, PAi.
In practice, when a user assigned to a role executes a query, the tuples that satisfy
the conjunction of query predicate and the permission are returned [5], [21]. Consider
for example Table 2.2 where Role1 has been assigned permission X with authorized
query predicate Age = 15-45 ^ Zip = 20-30.
2.4 Message Authentication Codes (MACs)
A MAC is a cryptographic checksum on data that takes as input a message m
and a secret key k and produces an output called authentication tag t = H(k,m).
The Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) algorithm is a shared-key se-
curity algorithm that uses a cryptographic hash function as an underlying function
and is used to verify data integrity and data-origin authentication. HMAC can be
used with any iterative cryptographic hash function (e.g., MD5, SHA-1, etc.) in
combination with a shared secret key. HMAC has been implemented in widely used
security protocols including SSL, TLS, SSH, and IPsec [22]. It is also used as a PRF2
for key-derivation, as in TLS [23] and IKE (the Internet Key Exchange protocol of
2A PRF is an e cient deterministic function and takes two inputs k and m. Its output is computa-
tionally indistinguishable from truly random output.
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IPsec) [24]. HMAC is also used as a PRF in a standard for one-time passwords [25].
This is the basis for Google authenticator . The main operation of HMAC is:
HMACk(m) = H((k   opad)||H((k   ipad)||m)), (2.1)
where opad (outer padding) is a constant byte 0x36, ipad (inner padding) is a
constant byte 0x5c [26], and   is bitwise eXclusive-OR (X-OR) operator.
Attacks
The most common attack on MACs is a forgery attack, in which an adversary can
produce a valid (message, tag) pair without knowing the secret key k. For MACs that
are based on iterative hash functions and use a compression function f : {0, 1}n+m !
{0, 1}n, there is a birthday-type forgery attack [27] that requires about O(2n/2) MAC
queries to its generation oracle, where n is the length of authentication tag.
Security
The cryptographic strength of HMAC depends on the properties of the underly-
ing hash function [28]. As we have mentioned, the most common attack against
HMACs is brute force to uncover the secret key. To have a secure MAC func-
tion, we want to have unforgeability ; that is, without knowing the secret key k, it
should be hard for an adversary A to find a pair (m, t) such that t = MACk(m),
even if A has access to some other valid (message, tag) pairs. Unfortunately, for
a secure hash function MACk(m) = H(k||m) does not guarantee that the MAC
function is unforgeable. Since H is computed using the Merkle–Dagmard construc-
tion, the graph MAC designed in this way is completely insecure, as it is quite
easy, given a valid pair (m, t), to create an (m0, t0), which is still valid. HMAC
HMACk(m) = H((k opad)||H((k ipad)||m)) avoids the above problem using two
layers of hashing [26].
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3. A PRIVACY MECHANISM FOR ACCESS
CONTROLLED GRAPH DATA
3.1 Introduction
Data anonymization schemes provide privacy-protection for published graph data.
However, the data publisher may use an authorization mechanism for controlling ac-
cess to data by group of users [29]. Access control policies provide additional safe-
guard against data breaches and are used to ensure that only authorized published
information is available to end-users based on their assigned role. Roles are abstract
descriptions of privileges for users accessing data in OSNs [30]. We assume a Role-
Based Access Control (RBAC) [31] administration model for the policy enforcement.
RBAC assigns access privileges to end-users based on their predefined roles. A leading
example in OSN services is Facebook1, which provides privacy features by allowing
the user to dictate access to their private information by employing fine-grained access
control policies [32], [33]. In OSN, either a centralized authority, a reference monitor,
decentralized authorities, or users themselves can carry out policy enforcement. We
consider a graph data publishing framework that provides safeguard against data pri-
vacy breach through anonymization while enforcing access rules to satisfy the security
protection requirements specified by the data publisher.
Since k-anonymization is a generalization approach, at the time of creating k-
anonymous partitions, we show that access control privileges might need be relaxed
to ensure k-anonymity privacy requirement with a relatively stronger guarantee. The
issue is, in order to accommodate imprecision bound false-positive tuples need to be
reduced that result in increased average partition sizes. Relaxing access control re-




role. Likewise, under strict policy the privacy is relatively weak compared to relaxed
semantics as we try to reduce false-negative tuples resulting in decreased average par-
tition sizes. This exhibits a trade-o↵ between privacy and access control. However, re-
laxing access control requirement should be bounded by access control administrator.
Discussion on access control model and policies is given in Sections 3.2.1 and 3.3.2.
Generally, high privacy is achieved at the cost of increased information loss [34]. A key
challenge is to ensure k-anonymity privacy protection of individuals within published
graph data and preserve data utility while enforcing an access control policy. For-
mally, given a set of roles with their associated imprecision bounds and a k-anonymity
requirement, the challenge is anonymize dataset such that maximum number of roles
satisfy their imprecision bounds and minimum information loss is incurred. For this,
we propose a k-anonymous Bi-objective Graph Partitioning (k-BGP) problem and
give hardness results (Section 3.3.1). This is a unique problem that has not been
considered earlier.
The chapter makes the following contributions:
• We formulate the k-BGP problem and give hardness results. Two heuristics
TSH1 and TSH2 are developed to solve the constraint problem.
• We provide empirical evaluation of the proposed heuristics with a benchmark
algorithm [35] from design perspective in terms of meeting privacy and access
control requirements with minimum information loss.
• Within the context of k-BGP problem, we present an architecture framework
elaborating how access control and privacy can be integrated (Section 3.3.2).
• We evaluate the proposed framework from security perspective and present a
probabilistic analysis for re-identification risk.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the needed
definitions and discusses the information loss measure. The problem formulation and
the access control framework are discussed in Section 3.3. In Section 3.4, we present
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the proposed heuristics for k-BGP problem. Section 3.5 provides performance eval-
uation and security analysis. Section 3.6 overviews the related work and Section 3.7
contains the summary of research contributions.
3.2 Background
3.2.1 Access Control Model for Graph Data
In this section, we discuss the semantics of role/query predicate evaluation with
respect to access control. For the query predicate evaluation over a graph, say G,
a vertex is added to the output result if all its attribute values satisfy the query
predicate. Moreover, the edges between the result vertex set are also returned as an
output. Here, we only consider conjunctive queries, where each query represents the
d-dimensional hyper-rectangle. The semantics for query evaluation on an anonymized
graph GP need to be defined. When a partition, say P , is fully included in the query
region, all the partition nodes and their associated edges are returned as part of
the query result. However, when a partition and a query partially overlap, there is
an uncertainty in the query evaluation. In this case, there can be several possible
semantics. The following three options are generally used:
1. Uniform. Assuming the uniform distribution of nodes in the overlapping parti-
tions, the result returns the nodes according to the ratio of overlap between the
query and the partition, and the edges between these nodes. Most of the litera-
ture uses the uniform distribution semantics to compare anonymity techniques
over selection tasks [19].
2. Overlap. This includes all nodes and their associated edges in the partitions
that overlap the role/query. This option will add false positives to the original
role/query result.
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(a) Original partitioned graph






























































(b) Anonymized graph GP
Fig. 3.1.: A graph and its corresponding published view.
3. Enclosed. This discards all nodes and their associated edges in all those par-
titions that partially overlap the role/query region. This option yields false
negatives with respect to the original role/query result.
For the remainder of this paper, we assume Overlap semantics as defined above.
Example 1 Consider the social network graph in Fig. 3.1(a) with 9 vertices and
10 edges with each vertex containing the two QI attribute values Age and Zip for
individuals in the graph. Table 2.1(b) shows the 2-anonymous partitioning of these
vertex attributes. In the anonymized published graph in Fig. 3.1(b), Partition (super-
node) P1 contains two verities and one edge represented as (2, 1); moreover, the min
and max values of the QI attributes are represented as a generalized tuple ([10 20, 25 
35]). similarly, Partition P2 is represented by the pair (2, 1) and the generalized tuple
([30 40, 40 45]); P3 is represented by the pair (3, 0) and the generalized tuple ([35 
65, 15   25]); and Partition P4 is represented by the pair (2, 1) and generalized tuple
14





Role1 ! X P1(2, 1) 10-20 25-35 |EP1P3 | = 2P3(3, 0) 35-65 15-25
Role2 ! Y P2(2, 1) 30-40 40-45 |EP2P3 | = 3P3(2, 1) 35-65 15-25
Role3 ! Z P4(2, 1) 50-60 55-60 NULL
([50 60, 55 60]). Now, consider the inter-partition edges in the published anonymized
graph. There are two edges between Partitions P1 and P3 represented by |EP1,P3 | = 2;
Similarly, |EP2,P3 | = 3 and |EP2,P4 | = 2. According to an access control policy, as
given in Table 2.2, with permission set {X, Y, Z} and its associated authorized query
predicates, the published graph view for role set {Role1, Role2, Role3} is as given in
Table 3.1. Since permission X assigned to Role1 overlaps two Partitions P1 and
P3, Role1 gets access to two super-nodes P1(2, 1) and P3(3, 0) and one super-edge
|EP1P3 | = 2 as part of the published graph along with their generalized tuples. Notice
that the published super-nodes contain the information about the number of nodes
and edges present within the partition. However, the access control policy ultimately
determines how much access to shared published data is allowed.
In this section, we give the definitions for role imprecision bound and describe the
information loss measure for the whole anonymized graph data.
3.2.2 Imprecision Bound for Roles
Let vn be a vertex in graph G with d QI attributes, A1, . . . , Ad. Vertex vn can be
expressed as a d-dimensional vector {vn(1), . . . , vn(d)}, where vn(j) is the value of the
jth attribute. Let DAi be the domain of QI attribute QIi, then vn 2 DA1⇥ . . .⇥DAd .
Any d-dimensional partition Pi of the QI attribute domain space can be defined as a d-
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dimensional vector of closed intervals {IPi1 , . . . , IPid }. The closed interval IPij is further
defined as [aPij , b
Pi
j ], where a
Pi
j is the start of the interval and b
Pi
j is the end of interval.
To publish a partition, each node vn in a Partition, say Pi, is replaced by the minimum
bounding intervals {IPi1 , . . . , IPid } of the partition to which the node belongs. A vertex,
say vn, belongs to a Partition, say Pl, if 8vn(i), vn(i) 2 IPli : aPli  vn(i)  bPli .
Consider a set of roles R, where Ri 2 R is defined by a Boolean function of predi-
cates on the set of QI attributes A1, . . . , Ad. A role defines a space in the domain of QI
attributes DA1 ⇥ . . .⇥DAd and can be represented by a d-dimensional rectangle or a
set of non-overlapping d-dimensional rectangles. To simplify the notation, we assume
that a role, say Rj, is a single d-dimensional rectangle represented by {IRj1 , . . . , I
Rj
d }.
A vertex, say vn, belongs to Rj if 8vn(i), vn(i) 2 IRji : a
Rj
i  vn(i)  b
Rj
i . Role Rj
and Partition Pl overlap if 8IRji , 8IPli , a
Rj
i 2 IPli or aPli 2 I
Rj
i .
Definition 3.2.1 (Role Imprecision) Role imprecision is defined as the di↵erence
between the number of nodes returned by a role/query evaluated on an anonymized
graph GP and the number of nodes for the same role/query on the original graph G.
The imprecision for role/query Ri is denoted by IRi,





The Role Ri is evaluated over GP by including all the nodes in the P 2 P that
overlap the role region.
Definition 3.2.2 (Role Imprecision Bound) The role imprecision bound, denoted
by BRi, is the maximum tolerable imprecision by a a role Ri and is preset by the access
control administrator.
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3.2.3 Information Loss and Utility Measure for Anonymized Graph Data
Given a graph, say G = hV,E, T i, and a partitioning, say P , of G’s nodes, the
information loss IL(P) associated with replacing G by the corresponding partitioned
network, GP = hVP , EP , T i, is defined as the weighted sum of two metrics,
IL(P) = w.ILD(P) + (1  w).ILS(P), (3.1)
where w 2 [0, 1] is a weighting parameter, ILD(P) is the descriptive information
loss that is caused by generalizing the exact QI records T to T , while ILS(P) is
the structural information loss that is caused by collapsing all nodes of V in a given
partition of VP to one super-node.
We use the same measure of information loss as proposed in [16]. For the descrip-
tive information loss, we utilize the Loss Metric (LM) measure [36], [37]. Assume
that an original node, say vn 2 V , belongs to a partition, Pi 2 P ; then vn’s QI
record, Tn = (Tn(1), . . . , Tn(d)), is generalized to T i = (T i(1), . . . , T i(d)), where d is
the number of QI attributes. The LM associates the following loss of information









where |T i(j)| is the size of the subset T i(j) that generalizes the original value
Tn(j), and |Ad| is the number of values in the domain of attribute Ad.
Notice that ILD(Pi) ranges between zero and one, where ILD(Pi) = 0 i↵ all
records in Pi are equal, and no generalization is applied, while ILD(Pi) = 1 i↵ all
records in Pi are so far o↵ that all attributes in the generalized record have to be
totally suppressed. The overall LM information is the result of averaging ILD(Pi) for









No generalization means maximum descriptive data utility, UD(P). Hence, UD(P)
is defined as UD(P) = 1  ILD(P).
Structural information loss can be categorized into two types:
• Intra-partition information loss: Given a partition, say Pi 2 P , the struc-
ture of Pi in the original graph is lost, and is replaced by the number of nodes
in Pi, and the number |EPi | of edges in E that connect nodes in Pi. The corre-
sponding information loss is quantified as the probability of wrongly identifying
a pair of nodes in Pi as an edge or as a non-connected pair, and it is evaluated
as follows:
ILS,1(Pi) = 2|EPi |.
✓
1  2|EPi ||Pi|(|Pi|  1)
◆
. (3.4)
• Inter-partition information loss: Given two partitions, say Pi, Pj 2 P , the
structure of edges that connect nodes from Pi to nodes in Pj is lost, and is
replaced by the number |EPiPj | of edges between nodes in these two partitions.
The inter-partition information loss is quantified as the probability of wrongly
identifying a pair of nodes in Pi and Pj as an edge or as a non-connected pair,
and is evaluated as follows:







Then, the overall structural information loss for partitioning P = {P1, P2, . . . , PM}














where the normalizing factor 4N(N 1) guarantees that ILS(P) ranges between zero
and one. The maximal value of one occurs when all edge counters (|EPi | and |EPi,Pj |)




/2) and |EPi,Pj | =
|Pi||Pj|/2 for all 1  i 6= j M).
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In an anonymized Graph, say GP = hVP = P , EP , T i, the structural utility US(P)
is defined as US(P) = 1  ILS(P). A generalized graph summarizes the structure of
the original graph. Let us consider two extreme cases:
One-to-one correspondence between nodes and super-nodes: This means each super-
node contains only one node (i.e., no intra-edge) and a pair of super-nodes does not
contain more than one inter-edge. The original graph structure is maintained as it is.
According to the structural loss formulation, the intra-partition loss, ILS,1(Pi) = 0,
for each partition as there is no intra-edge present within super-nodes; similarly, the
inter-partition loss, ILS,2(Pi, Pj) = 0, for all super-node pairs as there is at most one
inter-edge present between them. This results in ILS(P) = 0. Thus, the minimum
structural loss ILS(P) value corresponds to maximum structural utility US.
Generalized graph contains a single super-node: Under this case, the only informa-
tion revealed about the input graph is its size (number of nodes) and density (number
of edges). The user has absolutely no structural information available; hence we have
very low structural utility US value. In this case, inter-partition loss component,
ILS,2(Pi, Pj) = 0 as there are no inter-edges. The overall structural loss will be deter-
mined by the single super-node, i.e., ILS(P ) = ILS,1(P ) = 2e(1  2e|P ||P 1|). Therefore,
structural utility can be defined as US = 1   ILS(P ) value, i.e., a higher structural
loss means a lower structural data utility and vice versa.
3.3 Problem Description
3.3.1 The k-BGP Problem
We show that finding a k-anonymous graph partitioning that satisfies the role
imprecision bounds for the maximum number of roles while achieving minimal overall
information loss, IL(P), is NP-hard. The cardinality of a Role, say Ri, is the number
19
















(a) ILS = 0.42















(b) ILS = 0.51
Fig. 3.2.: Satisfying role bounds with minimum structural information loss.
of graph nodes falling within the role bounds. The constants rn and lv define a lower
bound on the number of the roles that should satisfy their bounds and an upper
bound on the value of information loss that an anonymization scheme is allowed to
incur. The decisional version of the k-BGP problem is defined below:
Definition 3.3.1 (Decisional k-BGP Problem) Given a Graph, say G = hV,E, T i,
with the vertices in a d-dimensional space, a set of roles Ri 2 R with imprecision
bounds BRi, and positive constants rn and lv, does there exist a k-anonymous graph
partitioning of vertices such that: i) the number of roles satisfying imprecision bounds
is greater than the positive constant rn, 1  rn  |R|, and the total graph information
loss, IL(P), is less than the positive constant lv, 1  lv  IL(P).
Theorem 3.3.1 (Decisional k-BGP Problem is NP-complete)
Proof Refer to Appendix A.
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Example 2 Consider the partition set P = {P1, . . . , P4} and the role set R =
{R1, R2} in Fig. 3.2. Both the partitions as given in Figs. 3.2(a) and 3.2(b) satisfy
the imprecision bounds of 3 and 0 for R1 and R2, respectively. We can calculate the
structural information loss, ILS(P), of the partitions as follows: Partitions P1, P2,
and P4 have two vertices and one connecting edge between them; their intra structural
information loss, ILS,1(Pi), is calculated as ILS,1(P1) = ILS,1(P2) = ILS,1(P4) =
2⇥ 1(1  2⇥12⇥1) = 0, while P3 has three vertices with no connecting edges among them.
Hence ILS,1 is ILS,1(P3) = 2 ⇥ 0(1   2⇥03⇥2) = 0. There are two inter-edges between
Partitions P1 and P2. The inter structural information loss, ILS,2(Pi, Pj), between
Partitions P1 and P2 is calculated as follows: ILS,2(P1, P2) = 2 ⇥ 2(1   22⇥3) =
8
3 ;
Similarly, ILS,2(P2, P3) = 3 and ILS,2(P2, P4) = 2. Thus, the total structural infor-




18 = 0.42. For Fig. 3.2(b), the intra-structural information loss for all partitions
ILS,1(P1) = ILS,1(P3) = ILS,1(P4) = 0 while ILS,1(P2) =
4
3 . The inter-partition
information loss for ILS,2(P1, P2) = ILS,2(P2, P3) = ILS,2(P2, P4) =
8
3 . The total
structural information loss for the partitioning in Fig. 3.2(b) after being normalized
is then ILS(P) = 283 ⇥
1
18 = 0.51. Thus, both partitions in Fig. 3.2(a) and 3.2(b)
satisfy an imprecision bound of 3 and 0 for roles R1 and R2, respectively. However,
the overall global structural information loss of the partitioning in Fig. 3.2(a) is less
than that of the partitioning in Fig. 3.2(b). Therefore, the partitioning in Fig. 3.2(a)
is more preferable.
3.3.2 Privacy-Enhanced Access Control
Fig. 3.3 presents a framework for privacy-enhanced access control mechanism for
graph data where the arrows represent the direction of information flow. The Privacy
Protection Mechanism (PPM) ensures that the privacy and role bound requirements
















Privacy Protection Mechanism !
Original!
Graph!
Fig. 3.3.: A framework for the proposed privacy-preserving access control mechanism
for graph data.
available to Access Control Mechanism (ACM). The Loss Reduction module further
minimizes the information loss while keeping the number of roles with satisfied bounds
fixed. The permissions in an access control policy are based on selection predicates
on the QI attributes. The policy administrator specifies the permissions along with
the imprecision bounds for each permission/role, user-to-role assignments, and role-
to-permission assignments [31]. The specification of the imprecision bound ensures
that the authorized data has the desired level of accuracy. The imprecision bound
information is not shared with the users because knowing the imprecision bound can
result in violating the privacy requirement [38].
Access Control Enforcement
Before making the sensitive data available to the access control module, both the
descriptive and and structural data of the graph are anonymized. Thus, we need to
define the access control enforcement over the anonymized graph data. In this section,
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we discuss the Relaxed and Strict access control enforcement policies (employed by
the Reference Monitor in Fig. 3.3) over the anonymized graph.
1. Relaxed: Relaxed access control uses overlap semantics to allow access to all
partitions that overlap a role/ permission.
2. Strict. Strict access control uses enclosed semantics to allow access to only those
partitions that are fully enclosed by the role/permission.
In this paper, the focus is on relaxed enforcement. In particular, when partitions
comprising the shared data between overlapping roles, say Ri, Rj 2 R, may contain
some non-shared data that is exclusively privileged to an individual role, say Ri; In
that case, the scope of the privilege set Ri is slightly increased resulting in relaxed
access control mechanism. We refer the reader to [38] for a detailed discussion of
these policies.
3.4 Heuristics for the k-BGP Problem
In this section, we present two algorithms based on greedy heuristics for graph
anonymization with minimal information loss under a given role/query workload with
their associated imprecision bounds. In the first stage, the vertices of the graph G
are partitioned recursively using a kd-tree [39] until the resulting partition sizes are
between k and 2k. The leaf nodes of the kd-tree are the partitions that are mapped
to super-nodes in the partitioned graph GP . The second stage of the heuristics (Al-
gorithm 3) further tries to minimize the information loss by rearranging the vertices
across P partitions under the following constraints: i) the number of role bounds
satisfied in first stage is not violated, and ii) each partition satisfies the k-anonymity
constraint.
3.4.1 Two-Stage Heuristic 1 (TSH1)
Lemma 3.4.1 The time complexity of TSH1 is O(d|R|2n2).
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Algorithm 1: TSH1
Input: G = hV,E, T i, k, R, and BRj
Output: GP = hVP = P , EP , T i
1 CP  G(V )); /* Initialize the set of Candidate Partitions. */
2 foreach CPi 2 CP do




4 Sort roles RO in increasing order of BRj ;
5 while the feasible cut is not found do
6 Select role from RO;
7 Create role cuts in each dimension;
8 Select dimension and cut having least overall imprecision for all roles in
R;
9 if Feasible cut found then
10 Create new partitions and add to CP ;
11 else
12 Split CPi recursively along the median till the anonymity requirement
is satisfied ;
13 Compact new partitions and add to P ;
14 GP = ConstraintRepartitioning(G, P);
15 return GP .
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Proof The time complexity of the first stage of TSH1 is derived by multiplying
the depth of the kd-tree by the amount of work performed at each level. The
height of the kd-tree in the worst case is nk , when each partition is exactly of size
k. In the worst case, at each partition level, we may have to check all roles for
a feasible cut, which leads to a d|R|2n complexity. Thus, the time complexity of
the first stage is O(d|R|2n2). The time complexity of the second stage, procedure
ConstraintRepartitioning (Algorithm 3), is O(d|R|n). For each partition Pa 2 P
the algorithm considers |PkNN(Pa)| = 2d nearest neighbor partitions2, 3 as the candi-
date destination partition Pb 2 PkNN(Pa). This has a time complexity of 2d|P| log |P|
for all partitions P . The time complexity of procedure RoleBoundViolations (Algo-
rithm 4) is O(d|R|n) as for each source partition Pa we consider only |PkNN(Pa)| = 2d
neighboring partition for imprecision calculation. Thus, the overall time complex-




k ) as log
n
k << |R|, this simplifies to
O(d|R|n). Adding the time complexities of both stages, the overall complexity of
TSH1 is O(d|R|2n2 + d|R|n) ⇡ O(d|R|2n2).
3.4.2 Two-Stage Heuristic 2 (TSH2): A Scalable Approach
In the Two-Stage Heuristic 2 algorithm (TSH2, for short), we modify TSH1 so
that time complexity of O(d|R|n log n) can be achieved in contrast to the O(d|R|2n2)
time complexity for TSH1. Because the complexity is subquadratic in network size
n and number of roles R, the TSH2 algorithm provides a scalable approach. This
heuristic only considers a role with the lowest imprecision bound to check the role cuts
for a given Partition, say Pi, and updates the role bounds as the partitions are added




from the imprecision bound BRj of each role, for a Partition, say Pi. For example, if
a partition of size k has imprecision 10 and 15 for roles R1 and R2 with imprecision
bound BR1 = 70 and BR2 = 90, then the bounds are updated to BR1 = 60 and
2The complexity to find kNN using a Kd-tree is O(k logN) [39]
3We consider only partition median points while finding the kNN partitions.
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Algorithm 2: TSH2: A Scalable Approach
Input: G = hV,E, T i, k, R, BRj
Output: GP = hVP = P , EP , T i
1 CP  G(V )); /* Initialize the set of Candidate Partitions. */
2 foreach CPi 2 CP do
3 // Depth-first (preorder) traversal




5 Select role from RO with smallest BRj ;
6 Create role cuts in each dimension;
7 Reject cuts with skewed partitions;
8 Select the dimension and the cut having the least overall imprecision for all
roles in R;
9 if Feasible cut found then
10 Create new partitions and add to CP ;
11 else
12 Split CPi recursively along the median till anonymity requirement is
satisfied ;
13 Compact new partitions and add to P ;
14 Update BRj according to IRj , 8Rj 2 R
15 GP = ConstraintRepartitioning(G, P);
16 return GP .
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Algorithm 3: ConstraintRepartitioning
Input: G = hV,E, T i, P
Output: GP = hVP = P , EP , T i
1 foreach Pa 2 P do
2 if |Pa| = k then
3 continue;
4 Compute PkNN(Pa); /* Determine k closest partitions. */
5 rvold = RoleBoundViolations(PkNN(Pa)); /* Compute the number of
role bound violations */
6 foreach |Pb| 2 PkNN(Pa) do
7 if |Pb| = k then
8 continue;
9 else
10 8va 2 Pa compute the di↵erence between the information loss,
 va:a!bIL(P) , if vn would move from Pa to Pb;
11 Let Pc be the partition for which  
va:a!b
IL(P) is minimal;
12 /* Check privacy constraint. */
13 if |Pc|+ 1 < 2k then
14 Move vn from Pa to Pc;
15 rvnew = RoleBoundViolations(PkNN(Pa));
16 if rvnew > rvold then
17 Restore PkNN(Pa);
18 Update the partition boundaries 8Pa 2 P ;





1 Inew = 0;
2 foreach r 2 R do
3 foreach p 2 P do
4 Inew = Inew + Irp ; /* Compute imprecision of overlapping roles
and partitions. */
5 return Inew.
BR2 = 75, respectively. Also, in TSH2, highly skewed partitions are rejected, i.e.,
role cuts are only feasible when the size ratio of the resulting partitions is not highly
skewed. We use a skew ratio of 1:99 for TSH2 as a threshold. If a cut results in one
partition having size greater than hundred times the other, then the cut is ignored.
Algorithm 2 (TSH2) has four di↵erences compared to TSH1. First, the kd-tree
traversal for the foreach loop in Lines 2-14 is based on preorder traversal. The
preorder traversal ensures that a given partition is recursively split till the leaf nodes
are reached. Then, the role bounds are updated. Second, in Line 14, the role bounds
are updated as the partitions are being added to P . Third, in Line 5 of Algorithm 2,
we use only one role for the candidate cut and fourth in Line 7, the partition size
ratio condition is checked to reject skewed partition cuts. If no feasible role cut is
found, then the partition is split using the median cut approach as in Line 12.
Lemma 3.4.2 The time complexity of TSH2 is O(d|R|n log n).
Proof The depth of the kd-tree for TSH2 is log 100
99
n. The work performed at each
level of the kd-tree is O(d|R|n) as we consider only one role for a feasible cut. Then,
the time complexity of the first stage is O(d|R|n lg n). As the time complexity of
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Algorithm 3 is O(d|R|n), the overall time complexity of TSH2 is O(d|R|n log n +
d|R|n) ⇡ O(d|R|n log n).
3.5 Performance and Security Analysis
This section evaluates the proposed framework (Fig. 3.3) for system design per-
formance as well as security analysis perspective. Section 3.5.1 presents performance
evaluation for the proposed heuristics in terms of meeting the desired access con-
trol and privacy requirements with minimum information loss. Section 3.5.2 provides
security analysis of the proposed framework from an attack perspective.
3.5.1 Performance Evaluation
This section presents a comparative assessment of the overall performance evalu-
ation of the proposed heuristics TSH1 and TSH2 in terms of satisfying access control
and privacy requirements and incurring minimum information loss.
Experiments have been conducted on a 2.4 GHz Intel Core i5 with 8 GB of 1600
MHz DDR3 SDRAM running Mac OS X operating system. All algorithms have been
implemented using Java 1.7. We present two di↵erent sets of experimental results. In
the first set of experimental results ‘Number of Role Violations’, we study the e↵ect
of anonymity parameter k on the number of role bound-violations, which is an access
control requirement. In the second set of experimental results ‘Information Loss Due
to Anonymization’, we study the changes in information loss value due to parameter
k.
Datasets and RBAC Policy
In the experimental results, we use the following real graph topologies: ego-Facebook,
p2p-Gnutella04, and com-Youtube available at Stanford Network Analysis Project
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(SNAP)4.We populate the vertices of these graphs (similar to [40]) with the Census
dataset from IPUMS5. The dataset is extracted for the Year 2001 using the following
attributes: Age, Gender, Marital status, Race, Birth place, Language, Occupation,
and Income. The categorical data values have already been converted to numeric
values. The first seven attributes are used as the QI attributes and are assigned to
graph nodes while Income is considered as a sensitive attribute.
Role Workload Generation
We generate 50, 80, and 500 roles as the workload/permissions for the ego-Facebook,
p2p-Gnutella04, and com-Youtube datasets, respectively. The roles are generated
according to the approach of [38], which selects two attribute tuples randomly from
the attribute tuple space and forms a role by making a bounding box of two tu-
ples. The generated role workload may be overlapped. A highly overlapped workload
means more sharing between roles, which signifies less data sensitivity and vice versa.
We can further classify this workload into three classes: low-overlap (LO), medium-
overlap (MO), and high-overlap (HO) and study the e↵ect of degree of overlap between
workloads on the proposed heuristics. If the overlap is between 10-20%, we consider
this as LO; if the overlap is between 40-50%, we consider this as MO; and similarly,
for an overlap in the range 80-90%, we classify this as HO. The average role size for
the 50 roles under LO, MO, and HO is 81, 124, and 145, respectively. Similarly, for
80 roles, the corresponding roles sizes for LO, MO, and HO workload are 153, 201,
and 263, respectively.






























































(b) TSH2, |R| = 50
Fig. 3.4.: E↵ect of BR on the % of role bound-violations for k = 5.
In this subsection, we evaluate the e↵ect of anonymity parameter k on the num-
ber of role bound-violations for the two proposed heuristics and compare the results
against TDSM [19] algorithm.
The imprecision bounds of all the roles are set based on the role size for the
current experiment. Otherwise, the bounds of the roles can be set by the access
control administrator. The intuition behind setting bounds as a factor of the role
size is that the imprecision added to the role is proportional to the role size [38].
In our experimental results, we set the role imprecision bounds to 20% of the role
size. Fig. 3.4 illustrates the e↵ect of the role imprecision bound on the number
of role bound-violations for a fixed value of the anonymity parameter k and three
di↵erent role overlapping workloads: LO, MO, HO. It is quite intuitive that as we
increase the role imprecision bound, the number of roles violating their imprecision
bound decrease. This occurs because the tolerance value for a role being violated is
increased.
From Figs. 3.5 and 3.7, observe that as we increase the value of k, the number
of role bound-violations also increase, suggesting that the role violations are depen-









































































































































































(f) |R| = 80, HO
Fig. 3.5.: E↵ect of k on the # of role bound-violations for BR = 20%.
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is increased), more roles are now overlapping the partitions, resulting in increased
imprecision, and hence more role bound-violations. Results in Fig. 3.6 support the
fact that as we increase the value of k, the role imprecision standard deviation (SD)
also increase, resulting in more role bound-violations.
Also in Figs. 3.5 and 3.7, algorithm TSH2 performs consistently better than TSH1
in terms of role bound-violations across all di↵erent datasets and role workloads as the
value of k is increased. The reason is that in TSH2, the role bounds of the overlapping
roles are updated as new partitions are added to the final partition set. This results in
generating compact partitions and thus results in fewer role bound-violations as more
partitions fall within role boundaries resulting in reduced imprecision. Moreover,
both the algorithm TSH1 and TSH2 perform consistently well compared with TDSM
across various overlapping role workloads.
Furthermore, observe from Fig. 3.5 that as we increase the role overlap, a fewer
number of roles are violated. This can be explained as follows: As we increase the
role-overlap, the average role size increases; this means that more partitions fall within
the role boundaries, and hence the role imprecision decreases, causing fewer roles to
violate their bounds. Secondly, the role bound is based on the cardinality of role size;
as we increase the role overlap, the average role size also increases and thus the role
bound also increases, causing fewer number of roles to be violated.
Information Loss Due to Anonymization
In this section, we study the e↵ect of changing k value on the information loss.
From Figs. 3.8, 3.9, and 3.10, we observe that as we increase the value of k, the
information loss value also increases for all the di↵erent datasets and overlapping role
workloads. However, this increase in loss value is non-linear.
Comparing algorithms TSH1 and TSH2, we observe that TSH2 has a higher infor-
mation loss value when compared to TSH1 for all di↵erent datasets and role workloads





























































































































































(f) |R| = 80, HO




























Fig. 3.7.: E↵ect of k on the # of role bound-violations for BR = 20% and R = 500.
In contrast to TSH1 (where we consider all roles overlapping a given candidate
partition to find a feasible cut), in TSH2 we consider only one role with the least
imprecision bound that is overlapping the candidate partition to find a feasible cut.
TSH2 has a lower computational complexity compared to TSH1. Moreover, if the
resulting split partitions are skewed, we reject the cut and choose to split the parti-
tions using the median-cut approach. So, we reduce the role search space and have
more median-cut-based partitions in TSH2 compared with TSH1. The median-cut
approach aims to obtain a uniform occupancy; this technique causes high descriptive
information loss when the data is skewed. More specifically, only one single attribute,
instead of multiple attributes available in QI set, is used to split a partition, this
causes the rest of the attributes in QI set to retain their least specific values, and
thus causes a high penalty for those values [41]. Secondly, according to reasoning
in [16], a higher structural information loss corresponds to clusters in which nodes
have similar connectivity properties with one another. In other words, when the nodes
in a cluster are either all connected (highly dense) or disconnected (highly sparse)
among themselves and with the nodes in other clusters and vice versa, we can explain











































































































































(f) w = 0.2, HO
Fig. 3.8.: E↵ect of k on information loss for ego-Facebook and |R| = 50.
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Algorithm TSH1 (having the higher computational complexity) has the lower over-
all information loss value due to anonymization between the two proposed heuristics.
TSH1 considers all the roles overlapping a given partition to determine a feasible
cut with the least imprecision bound; thus, the technique does not aim to obtain a
uniform occupancy, incurring a low information loss, when the data is skewed [41].
Secondly, as explained in [16], a smaller structural information loss corresponds to
clusters in which nodes have similar connectivity properties with one another, or, in
other words, when cluster nodes are either all connected (highly dense) or discon-
nected (highly sparse) among them and with the nodes in other clusters.
Furthermore, we observe that with the increase of role overlap, the performance
gap between the two proposed heuristics in terms of information loss narrows down.
Therefore, we conclude that TSH2 o↵ers a better performance in terms of satis-
fying more role bounds while it incurs more information loss. On the other hand,
TSH1 performs better in terms of information loss, but it violates more role bounds.
Both heuristics, however, perform well compared to TDSM in terms of number of
role bound-violations and information loss. The performance gap between the two
proposed heuristics, in terms of information loss, is between 5-15% for di↵erent work-
loads with varying degree of overlap. Table 3.2 summarizes the comparison between
the proposed heuristics.
In Figure 3.11, we plot the data utility results as we vary the value of parameter
k. The results show the data utility plots for both the descriptive data utility UD
and structural data utility US. We observe that the data utility value decreases as we
increase the value of parameter k. The reason is larger partition sizes result in more
information loss. The value of US is greater that 0.9 for all di↵erent cases. Moreover,
the value of UD is much lower than the value of US, which means information loss













































































































(e) w = 0.5, HO
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(f) w = 0.2, HO































































Fig. 3.11.: E↵ect of k on data utility.
Table 3.2.: Comparison of proposed heuristics
Heuristic Role violation Complexity Information Loss
TSH1 High O(d|R|2n2) Low
TSH2 Low O(d|R|n log n) High
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3.5.2 Security Analysis
This section presents a probabilistic analysis of the framework with respect to
re-identification attack. We assume that the adversary A is assigned a role, say
RA. Using some structural and attribute information about the target node x the
adversary A can pose a query to initiate a re-identicaiton attack on graph.
De-anonymization Attack Under an Access Control Policy
Our access control mechanism does not allow an adversary A with an assigned
role, say RA, to access data beyond his authorized privilege set as specified by RBAC
policy administrator. Therefore, according to our proposed RBAC mechanism, com-
plete graph de-anonymization is not possible by whatever background knowledge an
adversary A may have. The is because the scope of adversary A’s attack is assumed
to be confined to authorized data set.
Theorem 3.5.1 (Re-identification risk) Assume that the adversary A has some
structural and attribute information as background knowledge for re-identification of
a target node x. Given an anonymized graph GP = hVP = P , EP , T i, where each
partition Pi 2 P forms a hyper-rectangle in a d-dimensional data space with volume
Uvol =
Qd




i ] is the domain range for dimension i, the adversary
A’s attribute set Attr ✓ {QI1, . . . , QId} can be considered as forming a subspace




j=1 [Uj] ✓ Uvol, Li =
[Lmini , L
max








where PrQA(QS)(y) is the probability of y 2 cand(x) being a feasible candidate par-
tition for x, and is computed by first applying the adversary A’s structural information




















































Fig. 3.12.: (a) The e↵ect of QA = {[0 32], [0 0], [0 2], [0 3], [0 333], [0 32], [0 
4], [0  331]} on Pr(Re-id(x)). (b) The e↵ect of % increase in query QA = {A1, A6}
dimension on Pr(Re-id(x)).
|candQS(x)| is the number of feasible candidate partitions y in P returned as part of





) is the number of feasi-
ble candidate partitions y returned as part of query QA executed on candQS(x) set,
where Sj is the average of projection of all partitions along jth dimension, and Lj
and Uj are the corresponding projections for query QA and total domain space Uvol.
Similarly, PrQS(QA)(y) is the probability of y computed by first applying the adversary
A’s attribute information and then structural information. Note: For those attributes
that are not in the adversary A’s background knowledge, their complete domain space
is considered as part of A’s background knowledge.
Proof Please refer to Appendix B.
Example 3 We assume the adversary A has both attribute and structural informa-
tion as background knowledge. For evaluation purpose, we use the following attribute
domain ranges {[0   32], [0   0], [0   2], [0   3], [0   333], [0   32], [0   4], [0   331]}
from the IPUMA dataset.
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Fig. 3.13.: (a) Pr(Re-id(x)) vs query QA(QS) for k = 7; (b) Pr(Re-id(x)) vs query
QS(QA) for k = 7; (c) Pr(Re-id(x)) vs query QA(QS) for k = 9; (d) Pr(Re-id(x))
vs query QS(QA) for k = 9;
We consider two cascaded query scenarios: i) QA(QS), where the adversary A
first applies the structure based query QS and then applies the attribute based query
on the QA to determine the feasible candidate set cand(x) for a target node x, and
ii) QS(QA), where first the attribute information is used, and then the structural
information is applied to determine cand(x) set.
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Fig. 3.12(a) shows the e↵ect of changing the number of attributes in query QA
on re-identification probability. We observe that increasing the number of attributes
results in higher Pr(Re-id(x)) value. This is because, more background attribute
knowledge helps reduce |candA(x)| size, thus resulting in a higher Pr(Re-id(x)) value.
Fig. 3.12(b) studies the e↵ect of increasing the range query dimension on the Pr(Re-id(x))
value. The number of attributes in adversary A’s background knowledge are kept fixed
to attribute A1 = [0   32] and A6 = [0   32]. We observe that Pr(Re-id(x)) value
reduces as the volume of range query QA increases for a fixed number of attributes.
This is because, a large number of candidate partitions are returned resulting in lower
Pr(Re-id(x)) value.
Fig. 3.13(a)-(d) show the e↵ect of cascaded queries QA(QS) and QS(QA) on re-
identification probability Pr(Re-id(x)). Increasing the value of k generates less num-
ber of cand(x) partitions resulting in higher 1|cand(x)| value and reduces
1
k value. There-
fore, the overall value of Pr(Re-id(x)) is reduced. From Fig. 3.13(a), (d) we observe
that cascaded query QA(QS) results in higher Pr(Re-id(x)) value compared to cas-
caded query QS(QA) value. The reason being complete graph GP has less structural
discrepancy compared to graph obtained by first running attributed based query QA,
thus resulting in better filtration of candidates. Therefore, plots in Figs. 3.13(a) and
3.13(c) give higher value Pr(Re-id(x)) compared to Figs. 3.13(b) and 3.13(d) for
query QS(QA).
However, it is intuitive that having both attribute and structure information im-
proves the re-identification probability as the joint background knowledge results in
reduced candidate partition size cand(x) for a target node x.
3.6 Related Work
Although a number of anonymization schemes have been proposed for protecting
users’ privacy in published graph data (e.g., [42], [17], [43], [44], [45], [46], [47],
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[48], [49]), they implicitly assume that there is no authorization mechanism in place
for controlling access to data by group of users.
Almost all OSN services allow users to dictate sharing their profile information to
viewers through fine-grained, customized policies. For example, pErsona [32] hides
private data with attribute-based encryption (ABE) schemes. xAccess [33] presents
an automated RBAC policy specification mechanism to capture the implicit privacy
preference of social site users. Semantically interpretable functional “social roles”
are extracted from static network structure based on identified social roles, confiden-
tiality setting of personal data, and predefined user-permission assignments. Yuan
et al. [42] introduce a framework which provides privacy-preserving services based
on the user’s personal privacy requirements. Specifically, the formulation combines
the label generalization and the structure modification techniques by adding “noise”
edges or nodes in a way that satisfy privacy protection requirements. We consider a
data publishing framework where a centralized authority enforces the authorization
constraints through RBAC policy while providing data privacy protection through
anonymiation.
For the state-of-the art techniques in graph data anonymization and their classifi-
cation, we refer the reader to recent survey papers [2], [3]. Our graph anonymization
technique falls under the category of graph generalization/clustering based technique
[16], [17], [47]. Under this scheme, the graph is first partitioned into subgraphs.
Then, each subgraph is replaced by a super-node, which may be connected by super-
edges. The number of nodes in each super-node, along with the density of edges that
exist within and across super-nodes are published. Since the size of each cluster is
at least k, the probability of re-identifying a user can be bounded to at most 1k . Hay
et al. [17] propose an aggregation based graph anonymization algorithm, and study
the extent of node re-identification based on structural information using three types
of structural queries as an adversary background knowledge on anonymized graphs.
Bhagat et al. [47] design a class-based anonymization algorithm, which groups the
entities into classes and masks the mapping between entities and the nodes that rep-
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resent them in the anonymized graph. Our work is perhaps closest in philosophy
to [16], which proposes a greedy optimization solution that can be tuned to control
information loss. Their clustering algorithm takes into consideration loss of both node
labels and structure information. However, the interplay between access-control and
privacy-protection mechanisms has been missing.
Di↵erential Privacy (DP) [48] is another popular privacy protection approach,
where noise is added to query results to satisfy privacy constraints. However, DP is
viable for privacy-preserving data mining (PPDM) and it is still an open question if
it can practically support privacy-preserving data publishing (PPDP) [50].
3.7 Summary
We present a framework for privacy-enhanced access-controlled graph data. The
access control policies define the selection predicates available to roles/queries and
their associated imprecision bounds. Only authorized role/query predicates on sen-
sitive data are allowed by the access control mechanism. The privacy protection and
loss reduction module anonymizes the graph data such that maximum number of
roles satisfy their imprecision bounds and minimum information loss is incurred. For
this, we formulate a k-anonymous Bi-objective Graph Partitioning (k-BGP) problem
and give hardness results. Two heuristics TSH1 and TSH2 are developed to solve the
constraint problem. We provide empirical evaluation of the proposed heuristics with
a benchmark algorithm [35] from design perspective in terms of meeting privacy and
access control requirements with minimum information loss. Within the context of
k-BGP problem, we present an architecture framework elaborating how access control
and privacy can be integrated. We evaluate the proposed framework from security
perspective and present a probabilistic analysis for re-identification risk.
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4. EFFICIENT AND SCALABLE INTEGRITY
VERIFICATION OF DATA AND QUERY RESULTS FOR
GRAPH DATABASES
4.1 Introduction
Graphs are used for representing and understanding objects and their relationships
for numerous applications. Recent years have seen the emergence of many large graph
datasets. The most well known example is the Web, which now contains more than 50
billion Web pages and more than one trillion unique URLs 1. Other leading examples
include social networks, biological networks, semantic Web, XML documents, and
financial databases [51], [52].
To address this challenge, we propose two integrity verification schemes for graph
data using message authentication codes (MACs). MACs have been a fundamental
functionality for many recent developments in cryptography. These codes are used
for establishing an SSL/TLS connection and for ensuring the integrity of shared data
among multiple untrusted parties [22], [23]. Traditionally MAC functions handle mes-
sages as bit-strings and generate a MAC tag or “cryptographic checksum” to ensure
the integrity of input messages. We propose a methodology based on MACs for graph
data in order to verify the integrity of graph dataset. In the case of standard MAC-
based schemes (e.g., MACs, HashMACs, and HMACs), a message is either shared
completely or not shared at all with the user. In contrast, when graphs are used,
a user may receive part(s) of a graph in form of a query result(s). A major advan-
tage of using HMACs for graphs and redactable graphs is reduced computational
requirements and processing time as compared to the digital signature-based mech-







































































































Fig. 4.1.: Graphs: (a) DAG, (b) Graph with cycle v2 ! v3 ! v5 ! v4 ! v2, and (c)
DAG with multiple sources {v1, v7}.
properties like authentication of data source and non-repudiation [26]. However, in
many practical use cases, data protection requirements include only integrity verifi-
cation of data as other properties of digital signatures incur additional costs. To that
end, MACs have been developed for integrity verification. Freeman and Miller show
that HMACs are 15-20 times faster than RSA digital signatures [54]. Further, no
MAC-based technique has been proposed for graph data and graph query results. In
this paper, our focus is primarily on integrity verification of graph data and graph
query results using HMACs.
In case, data is stored on untrusted servers, generally integrity verification of graph
data is triggered when: i) data is updated, ii) user issues a query, or iii) we need to
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verify two graphs are identical2. Recently, hashing schemes have been proposed for
integrity verification of directed graphs [56]. Hashing is used as a core function for
integrity verification for all MAC-based schemes (e.g., HMACs and HashMACs) and
hash-and-sign methodology. HMACs are shown to be much times faster than RSA
digital signatures [54]. Therefore, in case integrity of graph data is to be assured
without losing on e ciency, cost and simplicity of implementation, it is preferable
to use schemes which do not employ digital signature-based techniques due to their
higher computational and processing cost. Merkle hash technique (MHT) has been
proposed as an approach for computing hashes for trees [57] and has been extended
for directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) [58]. MACs for trees, DAGs, and cyclic graphs
have not been well-studied in the literature. We present two e cient MAC-based
schemes for integrity verification of graph data and query results. The schemes can
be used by real-world graph database systems. In addition, we formally define MAC-
based schemes for graph data, and analyze the security properties (Section 4.5) with
respect to tampering of graph data in terms of its structure as well as data attributes.
4.1.1 Contributions
In summary, this chapter makes the following contributions:
• We have developed two schemes for graph data integrity verification
– HMACs for graphs for two-party data sharing, and
– Redactable HMACs for graphs for third-party data sharing.
• The proposed schemes can support “fail-stop” and “fail-warn” integrity as-
surance (Section 4.2.4) mechanisms, which can result in substantial saving in
the cost incurred for integrity verification and data re-transfer of compromised
graphs.
2Identical graphs are isomorphic graphs, but the reverse is not true [55].
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• We provide formal definitions and constructions of HMACs for graphs and
redactable HMACs for graphs.
• We prove that the proposed schemes are secure and protect the graphs and
redacted graphs from being compromised.
• Experimental results on real-world graph datasets show that HMACs for graphs
and redactable HMACs graphs are highly e cient compared to digital signature-
based schemes for graphs.
• The computational complexity of the proposed schemes is linear in the number
of vertices and edges in the graph. We compute one HMAC value and two
other verification objects for redaction as part of the query results that are
shared with the verifier. Therefore, our scheme is e cient both in processing
time and in the transmission of result set R and verification objects VO to the
client/user.
4.1.2 Organization
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 introduces background
and desiderata of HMACs for graphs. Section 4.3 and 4.4 introduce the schemes
HMAC for graphs (gHMAC) and redactable HMAC for graphs (rgHMAC), give their for-
mal definitions, and describe the constructions. Section 4.5 gives the security analysis
of the schemes. The complexity analysis and performance analysis are presented in
Section 4.6. Section 4.7 overviews the related work and Section 4.8 contains conclud-
ing remarks.
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4.2 Background and Desiderata of HMACs for Graphs
4.2.1 Data Model
We consider graph datasets which are modeled as a directed graph G(V,E), where
V is a set of nodes (or vertices) and E is a set of edges between these nodes; e(x, y) 2 E
is an edge from x to y, (x, y) 2 V ⇥ V . Undirected graphs can be represented as
directed graphs. Therefore, in what follows we consider only the case of directed
graphs and we will use the term graph with the meaning of directed graph. A node x
represents an atomic unit of data, which is always shared as a whole or is not shared
at all. A source is a node that does not have any incoming edge. A node x is called an
ancestor of a node y i↵ there exists a path consisting of one or more edges from x to y.
Node x is an immediate ancestor, also called parent, of y in G i↵ there exists an edge
e(x, y) in E. Nodes having a common immediate ancestor are called siblings. Let
G(V,E) and G (V , E ) be two graphs. We say that G (V , E ) is a redacted subgraph
of G(V,E) if G (V , E ) ✓ G(V,E). G (V , E ) ✓ G(V,E) if and only if V  ✓ V and
E  ✓ E. Also G (V , E ) ⇢ G(V,E) if and only if V  [ E  ⇢ V [ E. A redacted
subgraph G (V , E ) is derived from the graph G(V,E) by redacting the set of nodes
V  = V \V 0 and the set of edges E  = E \E 0 from G, where G0(V 0, E 0) is the subgraph
that is not part of the query result R = G (V , E ).
4.2.2 Graph Data Publishing and Query Model
In this paper, we consider two data publishing models: i) two-party data publish-
ing model (Fig. 4.2 (a)), and ii) third-party data publishing model (Fig. 4.2 (b)).
In the two-party data publishing model, there are only client and DO, which
communicate with each other directly. In other words, the DO has also the additional
responsibility of being a query front engine for processing the queries and generating
the results R = G (V , E ) as well. The third-party data publishing [9], [8], [59]
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Fig. 4.2.: System model for publishing and querying graph data.
1. Graph data owner (DO): The DO owns a graph database.
2. Database service provider (SP): The SP stores the graph database and acts as
a query front-end engine. The SP receives a graph query q from the database
client, processes it on behalf of the DO, and returns the graph query answer
R = G (V , E ) to the client. Since SP may not be trusted, it is required to
return not only the graph query result, but also verification object VO and the
DO’s tag to the client.
3. Database client: We assume that the client has access to shared secret key (k, r)
over a trusted secure channel. The client verifies the soundness (all the query
result graphs are answers and they are not tempered) and completeness (there
is no graph that is not in the query result but is an answer) of the query results.
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In the third-party data model, the SP is trusted to ”redact” the graph G to G 
such that V  ✓ V , and E  ✓ E. The vertices and edges that are not included in
the query result R = G (V , E ) are the ones that are redacted from G to result in
G  as part of the query processing. The SP is authorized to delete certain vertices
and edges from G resulting in G , which is then sent to the client as the query result
R = G (V , E ). The SP is not authorized to carry out any other operation(s) on
the graph that modifies its structure or content in any manner.
Query Model : Let Q(VQ, EQ, TQ) be a query graph Q, where VQ is the node set
of Q, EQ is the edge set of Q, and TQ = V !
P⇤ be a function that represents
the label value for each vertex in VQ. Our schemes assume a generic query model.
As an example, consider subgraph matching [59] which is defined as follows: For a
data graph G and a query graph Q, the goal of subgraph matching is to find every
subgraph g = (Vg, Eg) 2 G such that there exists a bijection f : VQ ! Vg that
satisfies 8v 2 VQ, TQ(v) = TG(f(v)) and 8e 2 EQ, (f(u), f(v)) 2 Eg, where TG(f(v))































Fig. 4.3.: An example of subgraph query matching.
Example 4 Consider the data graph G and query graph Q as given in Figs. 4.3(a)
and 4.3(b), respectively. Repeated labels in the graph G are subscripted with number
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i. The query graph Q matches two instances on data graph G and the output result
RG,Q = {(a1, b1), (a2, b2)} is shown in Fig. 4.3(c).
As part of our scheme user does not receive any duplicate vertices or edges in the
result R.
4.2.3 Threat Model
For a two-party data model (Fig. 4.2 (a)), we assume a trusted data model in
which both the DO and the client have access to the shared secret key (k, r). The
owner of the graph data computes the gHMAC using the shared secret key (k, r), and
the client/receiver of the graph data verifies the gHMAC using the key (k, r).
For a third-party data model (Fig. 4.2 (b)), we assume a semi-trusted model in
which the SP may not be completely trusted and it does not have access to the
gHMAC key k, but it can compute the query results. The SP may be the potential
adversary A or another adversary A who may have attacked and hacked the SP .
Under this model, we assume that the client and DO can exchange the shared secret
key k over a secure trusted channel.
4.2.4 Desiderata of MACs for Graphs
Challenges: The challenges in computing HMAC of a graph in contrast to com-
puting HMAC of a monolithic message bit-string are as follows:
• The graph is a semi-structured data object and is more complex than a sequen-
tial string/chain of bits in a monolithic message. How we ensure integrity of
the graph data depends on how we incorporate the edges and vertices in the
graph and the order, if any, between the nodes computing the HMACs.
• How can a verifier re-compute the same HMAC tag value as the value computed
by the DO? Graphs can be traversed in many ways by di↵erent parties. One
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needs to ensure that the verifier follows exactly the same traversal order as the
HMAC computing entity, DO, follows.
• How to ensure ensure integrity of each vertex and its structural position, i.e.,
the order between the sibling vertices?
• How to ensure integrity of each edge?
• The HMAC-based computation and verification schemes for graph data should
be quite e cient especially in contrast to the digital signature-based schemes,
because for monolithic messages, HMAC-based schemes are more e cient than
digital signature-based schemes.
Fail-stop HMACs: Integrity assurance of graphs opens up new challenges which
are not faced for the integrity assurance of monolithic messages – bit-strings. One
of these challenges is fail-stop integrity verification. Since graphs have vertices and
edges, the integrity verification process need to be terminated as soon as integrity of
a vertex or an edge is found to be compromised; thus saving computational cost (such
as cost of query processing in a cloud) and time, resulting in improved performance
requirements. Such saving can be substantial for large graph datasets. We can develop
HMACs that are fail-stop. Fail-stop HMACs should stop as soon as they determine
a compromise.
Fail-warn HMACs: Another variant of this type of integrity assurance is fail-
warn integrity verification. The integrity verification proceeds even after finding a
compromised vertex or edge, and outputs a set of all such vertices and edges that are
corrupted. The verifier/client may then request the data provider only those vertices
and edges that are compromised instead of requesting the complete data again. That
shall result in more e cient and cost-e↵ective database services, network usage and
quality of service.
Redactable HMACs: Given a graph, often part(s) of the graph are sent to a
client as part of a query result. It thus may be necessary for the verifier to be able to
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verify the integrity of such subgraph(s) using HMAC without the need to have access
to the graph itself. It is a challenging problem especially for HMACs because, unlike
in digital signatures, the key is symmetric, and thus no part of the key can be shared
with the SP , such as a cloud service. An HMAC-based scheme should be redactable
in the sense that a verifier can verify the integrity of the redacted graphs, i.e., the
subgraphs, with few integrity verification objects VO from the SP . In other words,
the SP does not have access to the secret key.
4.3 HMACs for Graphs (gHMAC)
4.3.1 Formal Definition
In this section, we provide the formal definition of hash message authentication
code for graphs (gHMAC).
Definition 4.3.1 (HMAC for Graph (gHMAC)) Given a graph G(V,E) with
vertex set V and edge set E, let g⇧ be a gHMAC for graph G, and let ⇧H = (GenH, H)
be a hash function with output length `. The scheme g⇧ consists of three polynomial-
time algorithms g⇧ ⌘ (gGen, gHmac, gVrfy) and is defined as follows:
1. gGen: On input 1n, the algorithm chooses a uniform k 2 {0, 1}n and runs
GenH(1n) to obtain a random r to generate the key (k, r).
2. gHmac: The algorithm takes as input a graph G(V,E) and a key (k, r) and
outputs a graph tag tG value and a source list SourceList of vertices. The
SourceList is the list of source vertices for traversing di↵erent components of
the graph, in case the components are disconnected. We write this as
(tG, SourceList) gHmac(k,r)(G(V,E)).
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3. gVrfy: The algorithm takes as input a graph G(V,E), a tag tG, a key (k, r),
and a SourceList. The algorithm outputs a bit b, with b = 1 meaning valid,
and b = 0 meaning invalid. We write this as
b gVrfy(k,r)(tG, G(V,E), SourceList).
4.3.2 HMAC Scheme for Graphs
Overview of Our Scheme
HMAC scheme, gHMAC, takes a graph G(V,E) and a shared secret key (k, r) as its
input. The key (k, r) that has two parts – k which is the secret key used in HMACs
and r which is a random bit-string (  128 bits). The gHMAC algorithm outputs an
HMAC value referred to as tag tG for the graph G(V,E) and a list of source nodes
SourceList generated during the graph traversal. The scheme traverses the graph in
DFS order and computes the graph hash ghash value after visiting each node. During
the traversal, it computes an integrity identifier, referred to as xor-out(u), for each
node u 2 G. The identifier is used to carry out “local integrity assurance” for that
node. Also during the graph traversal a list u.outList() is maintained to track the
order in which siblings of a node, say u, are visited. The scheme is highly e cient,
as it performs a single graph traversal to compute tag tG for graph G.
Detailed Description
The Algorithm 5 (gHMAC) initially marks all the vertices of G as unvisited and then
employs a DFS traversal to recursively visit all the unvisited vertices of the graph.
While visiting a particular vertex, say u, during a DFS traversal, the algorithm com-
putes out-xor(u) value, which is exclusive-or   of the label hash values labelHash of
all the descendant nodes of vertex u, and recursively calls the DFS algorithm. Once
a node is finally visited, the algorithm computes the ghash value by taking a hash of
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the concatenation of the the previous ghash value, a random value (r), and the vertex
hash value hashVal. After the graph traversal is complete, the algorithm computes
the HMAC value for G (Line 12) using the ghash value as input, where opad and
iPad are parts of HMAC computation, as explained in Section ??.
The graph verification scheme Algorithm 6 (gVrfy) computes a new tag t0G value
on user’s behalf and compares it with the received tag tG value for integrity verifica-
tion. The graph verification algorithm gVrfy takes a graph G(V,E), a tag tG value for
G, as well as a shared secret key (k, r), as input. The algorithm outputs a boolean 1,
if verification passes, or 0, otherwise. Algorithm 6 is almost identical to Algorithm 5,
except that it computes a new tag t0G value and compares it against the received tag
tG value for verification purpose.
4.3.3 Illustration of How gHMAC Works
Example 5 Graph HMAC computation
Consider the graph G in Fig. 4.4(a), which represents a DAG. Each vertex con-
tains a label, which is an alphabet and the SourceList = {v1}. The hashVal com-
putation for a vertex, say u, requires first computing the integrity verifier out-xor(u)
for that vertex. For example, consider Fig. 4.4(b) where vertex v2 has two descen-
dant vertices v3 and v4. The out-xor(v2) value is computed as H(c)   H(d), which
is the exclusive-or   of labelHash values of its descendants, i.e., vertices v3 and
v4. The u.outList() for each vertex u contains the ordering information among
the siblings of a parent vertex, say u, visited during the traversal. In this case,
v2.outList() = {v3, v4}, which shows that vertex v3 is visited before the vertex v4.
For the above example, the vertex hash value hashVal and graph hash value ghash
are computed in the following order of vertices v6 ! v5 ! v4 ! v3 ! v2 ! v1, which
is G’s post-order traversal.
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Algorithm 5: gHMAC (Compute graph HMAC for two-party data model.)
Input: G(V,E), (k, r)
Output: tG, SourceList
1 ghash = NULL.
2 SourceList = NULL.
3 foreach vertex u 2 G.V do
4 u.color = WHITE.
5 u.outList = EMPTY.
6 u.labelHash = NULL.
7 u.hashVal = NULL.
8 foreach vertex u 2 G.V do
9 if u.color == WHITE then
10 SourceList.add(u).
11 ghash = DFS-VISIT(G, u) .
12 tG  H((k   opad)||H((k   ipad)||r||ghash)).
13 return (tG, SourceList).
14 DFS-VISIT(G, u)
15 begin
16 u.color = GRAY.
17 out-xor(u) = u.labelHash = H(u.label).
18 foreach v 2 descendants(u) do
19 u.outList().add(v).
20 if v.labelHash == NULL then
21 v.labelHash = H(v.label).
22 out-xor(u) = out-xor(u)  v.labelHash.
23 if v.color == WHITE then
24 DFS-VISIT(G, v).
25 u.color = BLACK.
26 u.hashVal = H(r||out-xor(u)||u.label||u.content).
27 ghash = H(ghash||r||u.hashVal).
28 return ghash.
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Algorithm 6: gVrfy (Verify graph integrity using HMAC tag for two-party
data model.)
Input: G(V,E), (k, r), tG, SourceList
Output: Output: 0/1
1 ghash = NULL.
2 foreach vertex u 2 G.V do
3 u.color = WHITE.
4 u.outList = EMPTY.
5 u.labelHash = NULL.
6 u.hashVal = NULL.
7 while SourceList 6= EMPTY do
8 u = SourceList.getNext().
9 if u.color == WHITE then
10 ghash = DFS-VISIT(G, u).
11 t0G  H((k   opad)||H((k   ipad)||r||ghash)).






18 u.color = GRAY.
19 out-xor(u) = u.labelHash = H(u.label).
20 foreach v = u.outList().get() do
21 if v.labelHash == NULL then
22 v.labelHash = H(v.label).
23 out-xor(u) = out-xor(u)  v.labelHash.
24 if v.color == WHITE then
25 DFS-VISIT(G0, v).
26 u.color = BLACK.
27 u.hashVal = H(r||out-xor(u)||u.label||u.content).



















out-xor(2) = H(c) xor H(d)!




















out-xor(2) = H(c) xor (d !




Fig. 4.4.: A DAG with source node id = 1, (b) Computation of out-xor(u), and
u.outList() of vertices.
4.4 Redactable HMACs for Graphs (rgHMAC) and Query Processing
4.4.1 Formal Definition
In this section, we provide a formal definition for hash message authentication
code for a redacted graph and query model described below.
Definition 4.4.1 (Redactable HMAC for graph) Given a graph G(V,E) with
vertex set V and edge set E, a redactable HMAC scheme for graph rg⇧ consists
of four polynomial-time algorithms rg⇧ ⌘ (rgGen, rgHmac, gRedact, rgVrfy):
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1. rgGen: On input 1n, this algorithm chooses a uniform k 2 {0, 1}n and runs
GenH(1n) to obtain a random r to generate the key is (k, r).
2. rgHmac: The tag-generation algorithm takes a graph G(V,E) and the key (k, r)
as its input, and outputs a pair (tG, SourceList), where tG is a tag for graph
and SourceList is the list of source vertices for traversing di↵erent components
of the graph, in case the components are disconnected. Since the algorithm may
be randomized, we write this input/output behavior as
(tG, SourceList) rgHmac(k,r)(G(V,E)).
3. gRedact: The redaction algorithm takes a graph G(V,E), set of nodes V 0  ✓ V ,
set of edges E 0  ✓ E, source list SourceList of vertices, a set of vertex hash
values VH = {u.hashVal|v 2 G.V }, and a set of edge hash values EH =
{e(u, v).hashVal|e(u, v) 2 G.E} as its input. The algorithm outputs a redacted
graph G (V , E )3, where G (V , E ) is derived from G(V,E) consisting of ver-
tices in V  = V \ V 0  and E  = E \ E 0 , a source list of vertices SourceList ,
and two verification objects: vo-g and vo-out. We represent the algorithm to
generate the required query output as follow:
(G (V , E )| {z }
R
, SourceList , vo-g, vo-out| {z }
VO
) 
gRedact(G(V,E), SourceList, V 0  , E
0
 ,HV ,HE).
4. rgVrfy: The deterministic verification algorithm takes as input the query result
G (V , E ), a tag tG  , a key (k, r), a source list SourceList  of vertices, and
two verification objects: vo-g and vo-out. The algorithm outputs a bit b, with
3Note: As mentioned earlier R = G (V , E ) is the result of user query. The query result also
includes the required VO.
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b = 1 meaning the result is valid, and b = 0 meaning the result is invalid.
We write this validation of query result as
b rgVrfy(k,r)(tG  , G (V , E ), vo-g, vo-out).
4.4.2 Redactable HMAC Scheme for Graphs
Overview of Our Scheme
In this section, we provide the construction for rgHMAC scheme. The third-party
SP follows the redaction model discussed earlier in Section 4.2.4. As the third-party
does not have access to the shared secret key (k, r), the challenge is to develop a
scheme for generating a tag tG value for redacted graph G . In particular, we gener-
ate two di↵erent hash values: e(u, v).hashVal for edges and u.hashVal for vertices.
Expensive operations for computing ghash value are not desirable. Therefore, the
exclusive-or   operator, which is both commutative and associative can be utilized
in combination with vertex and edge hash values. The exclusive-or   operator is
purely used for confidentiality purpose and, in this case, as part of our scheme, it acts
as a mechanism for integrity preservation.
Detailed Description
The proposed HMAC scheme rgHMAC (Algorithm 7) takes as input a graphG(V,E),
a shared secret key that has two parts (k, r) – k is the secret key used in HMACs
and r is a random bit-string (  128 bits). The algorithm outputs an rgHMAC value
referred to as tag tG for G, and a list of source nodes SourceList generated during
the graph traversal. Initially, all the vertices are marked as unvisited. The algorithm
carries out a DFS traversal on the unvisited vertices to compute the vertex hash val-
ues v.hashVal for all v 2 V and the edge hash values e(u, v).hashVal for all e 2 E. In
addition, during traversal, a list u.outList is maintained to track the order in which
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Algorithm 7: rgHMAC (Compute graph HMAC for third-party data model.)
Input: G(V,E), (k, r)
Output: tG, SourceList
1 ghash = r.
2 foreach vertex u 2 G.V do
3 u.color = WHITE.
4 u.outList = EMPTY.
5 u.hashVal = NULL.
6 foreach vertex u 2 G.V do
7 if u.color == WHITE then
8 SourceList.add(u).
9 ghash = DFS-VISIT(G, u).
10 tG  H((k   opad)||H((k   ipad)||r||ghash)).
11 return (tG, SourceList).
12 DFS-VISIT(G, u)
13 begin
14 u.color = GRAY.
15 out-xor(u) = 1.
16 foreach v 2 descendants(u) do
17 u.outList().add(v).
18 e(u, v).hashVal = H(r||u.label||v.label).
19 out-xor(u) = out-xor(u)  e(u, v).hashVal.
20 if v.color == WHITE then
21 DFS-VISIT(G, v).
22 u.color = BLACK.
23 u.hashVal = H(r||out-xor(u)||u.label||u.content).
24 ghash = ghash  u.hashVal.
25 return ghash.
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Algorithm 8: gRedact (Generate query result R = G (V , E ) and verification
object VO for third-party data model.)
Input: G(V,E), Q(VQ, EQ), SourceList, VH, EH
Output: R = G (V , E ), SourceList , VO = {vo-g, vo-out}
1 vo-g = NULL.
2 vo-out = EMPTY.
3 SourceList  = EMPTY.
4 foreach vertex u 2 G.V do
5 u.color = WHITE.
6 u.outList = EMPTY.
7 u.hashVal = NULL.
8 Compute R = G (V , E ) /* Query processing result. */
9 while SourceList 6= EMPTY do
10 u = SourceList.getNext().
11 if u 2 V  then
12 SourceList .add(u).
13 DFS-VISIT(G, u, true).
14 else
15 DFS-VISIT(G, u, false).
16 DFS(G, u, flag)
17 begin
18 if u.color 6= WHITE then
19 return.
20 u.color = GREY.
21 if flag == false and u 2 V  then
22 SourceList .add(u).
23 flag = true.
24 if u 2 V  then
25 vo-out(u) = 1.
26 foreach v = u.outList.getNext() do
27 if (v 2 V ) and (e(u, v) 2 E ) then
28 u.outList .add(v).
29 else
30 vo-out(u) = vo-out(u)  e(u, v).hashVal.
31 vo-out.add(vo-out(u)). /* Compute VO. */
32 if v.color == WHITE then
33 DFS-VISIT(G, v, flag).
34 else
35 if vo-g == NULL then
36 vo-g = u.hashVal.
37 else
38 vo-g = vo-g   u.hashVal. /* Compute VO. */
39 u.color = BLACK.
40 return (G (V , E ), SourceList , vo-g, vo-out).
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Algorithm 9: rgVrfy (Verify integrity of query result R = G (V , E ) for third-
party data model.)
Input: R = G (V , E ), (k, r), SourceList , VO = {vo-g, vo-out}, tG
Output: Output: 0/1
1 ghash = r.
2 foreach vertex u 2 V  do
3 u.color = WHITE.
4 u.outList = EMPTY.
5 u.hashVal = NULL.
6 while SourceList  6= EMPTY do
7 u = SourceList .getNext().
8 if u.color == WHITE then
9 ghash = ghash DFS(G , u).
10 ghash = ghash  vo-g.
11 t0G  H((k   opad)||H((k   ipad)||r||ghash)).






18 u.color = GREY.
19 out-xor(u) = vo-out(u).
20 foreach v = u.outList .getNext() do
21 e(u, v).hashVal = H(r||u.label||v.label).
22 out-xor(u) = out-xor(u)  e(u, v).hashVal.
23 if v.color == WHITE then
24 DFS-VISIT(G, v).
25 u.color = BLACK.
26 u.hashVal = H(r||out-xor(u)||u.label||u.content).
27 ghash = ghash  u.hashVal.
28 return ghash.
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the siblings of a node, say u, are visited. The ghash value is computed recursively
by taking the exclusive-or   of u.hashVal value with the previously computed ghash
value.
The algorithm gRedact (Algorithm 8) is executed by the third-party data distrib-
utor, which does not have access to shared secret key k, which poses a challenge to
generate a ghash value. An approach is to use the   operator in combination with
the hashVal. Algorithm 8 takes as input a graph G(V,E), a vertex set V 0  , an edge
set E 0 , a set of vertex hash values VH = {v.hashVal|v 2 G.V } and a set of edge hash
values EH = {e(u, v).hashVal|e 2 G.E}. The algorithm outputs a redacted graph
G (V , E ), a list of source nodes SourceList , a verification object vo-g for graph ,
and the set of verification objects vo-out. The algorithm carries out a DFS traver-
sal to compute the verification objects vo-g and vo-out during the graph traversal.
During the graph traversal, for each vertex u 2 V  a verification object vo-out(u) is
computed, which contains the   of label hash values of those ancestors of u that are
not present in the set V . Similarly, for those vertices which are in u /2 V  the algo-
rithm computes the verification object vo-g, by performing exclusive-or   operation
on the vertex hash value hashVal of those vertices which are not in the set V .
The algorithm rgVrfy (Algorithm 9) performs the graph verification. It takes
as input a graph G (V , E ), a tag tG, a shared secret key k, a random number
r, a verification object vo-g for graph G(V,E), and the sets of verification object
vo-out. The algorithm outputs a boolean 1, in case of verification process success, or
0, otherwise. The main idea of the verification algorithm rgVrfy is to compute the
value for ghash  for the redacted graph G (V , E ) first and then an exclusive-or  
with verification object vo-g value to compute the ghash value of the complete graph
G. The algorithm computes a new tag t0G using this ghash value and compares it
against tG for integrity verification. The algorithm performs a DFS traversal on the
graph G , which is received as part of the query result, and computes the integrity
verifier out-xor(u) for each vertex v 2 V . Notice out-xor(u) is initialized with
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vo-out(v), which contains   of label hash labelHash values of those descendant













































Fig. 4.5.: (a) A DAG where the shadowed part with dotted boundary is the subgraph
G  that the user receives as part of query result. (b) Verification object set vo-out
computation for vertices in V .
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4.4.3 Illustration of How rgHMAC Works
Example 6 (Generation of VO for query result R = G (V , E )) Consider the
graph in Fig. 4.5(a), which is a DAG. Each vertex is labeled with an alphabet. Suppose
the shaded part of the graph with dotted boundary is the subgraph G (V , E ), which
the user receives as part of the query result R. The algorithm gRedact determines
the sets V  = {v4, v5} and V \ V  = {v1, v2, v3, v6} as part of the query processing
step. The user receives the graph G  and two sets of verification objects, which are
vo-g, and vo-out, as part of query result. For all the vertices that are not part of
the query result R (i.e., v /2 V ), the verification object vo-g computes exclusive-or
  of the vertex hash values hashVal in a post-order fashion, vo-g = v6.hashVal  
v3.hashVal   v2.hashVal   v1.hashVal. On the other hand, for the set of vertices
that are in V  = {v4, v5}, the algorithm computes vo-out(u), which considers only
those descendants of a vertex, say u 2 V , which are not not present in V . For
example, from Fig. 4.5(b), we can notice that vertex v4 has no descendants outside
the set V , while vertex v5 has only one descendant vertex v6 outside the set V .
Therefore, the verification object vo-out(v4) = NULL as this vertex has no descendant
and vo-out(v6) = e(v5, v6).hashVal.
4.4.4 Fail-stop and Fail-warn gHMAC and rgHMAC
One of the key advantages of the proposed HMAC-based schemes is that the
HMAC verification process correctly identifies if a node or edge has been compro-
mised. In particular,if a node is compromised with respect to its label or content, the
node can be identified by computing the hash value of the label and content of the
node along with the r. Similarly, if an edge e(x, y) is tampered, the out-xor(x) will
be incorrect, resulting in an incorrect hashVal computed for x. Furthermore, the end
vertices of the edge are considered to be compromised.
In case of tampering, the following steps can be taken:
















v4.hashVal= H(r || out-xor(v4) || v4.label || v4.content)
(a)
Fig. 4.6.: Fail-stop / Fail-warn integrity verification example.
• Fail-warn: Continue the verification process, however, warn the system or the
user that a compromise has been detected. The process then maintains a list
such compromised vertices and edges.
One of the actions of fail-stop or fail-warn system is to request the DO or SP
to send those vertices and edges that have been compromised to the end user. Such
requests can be in real-time, in batch, or after the completion of at the end of integrity
assurance process. There is no need to request the complete data unlike in monolithic
messages. Therefore, by avoiding the tampering of data, the proposed HMAC-based
schemes can result in substantial cost saving time for re-sending data.
Example 7 (Fail-stop / Fail-warn scheme) Consider the example given in Fig. 4.6,
where the label of vertex v4 is changed from ‘c’ to ‘x’ and a new edge e(v4, v6) is added.
As explained in Example 6 for the set of vertices in R = V  = {v4, v5} the verifica-
tion object vo-out(v5) is computed as e(v5, v6).hashVal; whereas the verification ob-
ject vo-out(v4) for the new graph G0 is computed as vo-out(v4) as e(v4, v6).hashVal
value. However, as the value e(v4, v6).hashVal is not present with SP, it can be
determined that the edge e(v4, v6) has been added externally and is not a part of
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the original graph. For the set of vertices V \ V  = {v1, v2, v3, v6} the verification
object vo-g is computed as exclusive-or   of the vertex hash values hashVal in post-
order fashion, vo-g = v6.hashVal   v3.hashVal   v2.hashVal   v1.hashVal. During
the vo-g computation vertex v2’s hash value hashVal is computed as v2.hashVal =
H(r||out-xor(v2)||v2.label||v2.content), where out-xor(v2) = e(v2, v3).hashVal  
e(v2, v4).hashVal. e(v2, v4).hashVal will not evaluate to a correct value as v4 has a
tampered label ‘x’ resulting in an incorrect value for v4.hashVal as determined by SP.
Therefore, SP can continue the execution of algorithm and keep track of values that
have been modified or stop the execution.
4.5 Security Analysis
In this section, we review the security of gHMAC and rgHMAC schemes. We
present two lemmas with their proofs.
4.5.1 Security of gHMAC
Lemma 4.5.1 Let the hash function H be an implementation of a random oracle,
and gh refer to the gHMAC of graph G(V,E). Under the random oracle model, and
under the assumption that the secret key is known only to the DO and the client, the
gHMAC scheme is secure, i.e., a probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) adversary A
cannot compute gh0 as the gHMAC of G0(V 0, E 0) such that gh = gh0.
Proof Suppose the adversary A can compute gh0 for a di↵erent graph G0 such that
gh = gh0. Consider the case that adversary A has modified G in an unauthorized
manner that resulted in G0. Following unauthorized modifications of the graph may
be carried out by adversary A:
• Label modification: Suppose the label of a vertex x x.label is modified to
x.label0; then gh = gh0 if and only if (1) and (2) are true: (1) out-xor(x) =
out-xor(x)0, which is true, i↵ H(x.label) = H(x.label0), and (2) x.hashVal =
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x.hashVal0, which is true, i↵ H(r||out-xor(x)||x.label||x.content) =
H(r||out-xor(x)||x.label0||x.content). In order for (1) and (2) to be true,
adversary A has to carry out pre-image attacks on the hash function H, which,
however, contradicts our assumption that H is a random oracle.
• Content modification: The argument follows the reasoning for label mod-
ification above. Suppose the content of a vertex x x.content is modified to
x.content0; then gh = gh0 if and only if the following is true: x.hashVal =
x.hashVal0, which is true, i↵ H(r||out-xor(x)||x.label||x.content)
= H(r||out-xor(x)||x.label||x.content0). In order for it to be true, adversary
A has to carry out pre-image attacks on the hash function H, which, however,
contradicts our assumption that H is a random oracle.
• Vertex insertion: Consider that a vertex z is added to the graph G(V,E) by
adversary A in order to result in a compromised graph G0 where z 2 V 0 and
gh = gh0. This implies that at the end of traversal of vertex z, the computed
ghash0 value (that does include z.hashVal) is identical to that of ghash, which
does not include z.hashVal as per Algorithm 5 line 27. It is possible, however,
if and only if, adversary A has been successful in carrying out pre-image attacks
on the hash function H, which, however, contradicts our assumption that H is
a random oracle.
• Vertex deletion: Consider that a vertex z is deleted from the graph G(V,E)
by adversary A in order to result in a compromised graph G0 where z 2 V ^
z /2 V 0 and gh = gh0. This implies that at the end of traversal of graph G0,
the computed ghash0 value (that does not include z.hashVal) is identical to
that of ghash, which includes z.hashVal as per Algorithm 5 line 27. It is
possible, however, if and only if, adversary A has been successful in carrying
out pre-image attacks on the hash function H, which, however, contradicts our
assumption that H is a random oracle.
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• Edge insertion: An edge e(x, y) is added to the graph G(V,E) by adversary
A in order to result in a compromised graph G0 where e(x, y) /2 G and x, y
are in both G and G0. If either of x, y are vertices inserted by adversary A
in G0 and are not in G, then it can be addressed as per the arguments for
vertex insertion above. However, out-xor(x) 6= out-xor(x)0 because out-xor(x)
contains y.labelHash0. Thus, (1) x.hashVal 6= x.hashVal0, and (2) ghash 6=
ghash0. (1) and (2) are true if and only if adversary A has been successful
in carrying out pre-image attacks on the hash function H, which, however,
contradicts our assumption that H is a random oracle.
• Edge deletion: An edge e(x, y) is deleted by adversary A from G such that
e(x, y) /2 G0 and x, y are in both G and G0. If either of x, y are vertices inserted
by adversary A in G0 and are not in G, then this can be addressed as per
the arguments for vertex insertion above. However, out-xor(x) 6= out-xor(x)0
because out-xor(x)0 does not include y.labelHash. Thus, (1) x.hashVal 6=
x.hashVal0, and (2) ghash0 6= ghash of G. (1) and (2) are true if and only if
adversary A has been successful in carrying out pre-image attacks on the hash
function H, which, however, contradicts our assumption that H is a random
oracle.
• Edge modification: An edge e(x, y) 2 G is modified by adversary A to
e(x, z) 2 G0 such that z is a node in G and G0 and there is no edge from
x to z in G. However, out-xor(x) 6= out-xor(x)0, because out-xor(x)0 does
not contain y.labelHash, but contains z.labelHash. Thus, (1) x.hashVal 6=
x.hashVal0, (2) z.hashVal 6= z.hashVal0, (3) y.hashVal 6= y.hashVal0, and (4)
ghash 6= ghash0. (1), (2), (3), and (4) are true if and only if adversary A
has been successful in carrying out pre-image attacks on the hash function H,
which, however, contradicts our assumption that H is a random oracle. Any
edge modification, such as e(x, y) is modified to e(y, x), can also be reasoned as
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above. If more than one edges and vertices are modified, then the arguments
above can be extrapolated to the ones above. Thus, the proof follows.
4.5.2 Security of rgHMAC
Lemma 4.5.2 Let the hash function H be an implementation of a random oracle
and gh refer to the rgHMAC of graph G(V,E). Under the random oracle model, and
under the assumption that the secret key is known only to the DO and the client, the
rgHMAC scheme is secure, i.e., a PPT adversary A (assumption is adversary A is not
the third-party data publisher that can redact G to G ) cannot compute gh0 as the
rgHMAC of G0(V 0, E 0) such that gh = gh0.
Proof For PPT adversary that is not in the third-party data publisher SP , the
proofs follow from Lemma 1.For PPT adversary that is the third-party data publisher
SP , the proofs are as follows. Suppose the adversaryA can compute gh0 for a di↵erent
graph G0 such that gh = gh0. Consider the case that adversary A modified G in an
unauthorized manner that resulted in G0. The following unauthorized modification
of the graph may be carried out by adversary A:
• Insertion of vertices: One or more vertices w1, w2, . . . , wm may be inserted
to G  resulting in the updated graph G0 , where wi /2 V , 1  i  m. Consider
one vertex w1 being added by adversary A in G  resulting in G0 . Adversary A
updates all other values as needed. vo-g0 is computed by the adversary A as
vo-g   w1.hashVal, so that computation of ghash (Line 10 of Algorithm 9) by
the client/verifier cancels out the w1.hashVal computed and  -ed with ghash
during the DFS traversal (Line 27 of the Algorithm 9). Note that w1.hashVal 
vo-g0 results in vo-g by the property of exclusive-or   operator (i.e., r1  r2  r2
= r1). However, in order to be able to compute w1.hashVal, the adversary
A either (1) knows random r, which is part of secret key (k, r), or (2) can
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assign w1.label and/or w1.content such that w1.hashVal as computed by the
adversary A matches with the value as computed by the verifier (Line 27 in
Algorithm 9). (1) contradicts our assumption that the secret key is known only
to the DO and client/verifier, and (2) contradicts our assumption that H is a
random oracle. Without loss of generality, the argument can be extended to
insertion of multiple vertices w1, w2, . . . , wm.
• Label, content, or edge modification: Label, content, or edges of G  are
modified by adversary A that results in G0 . However, random r (part of secret
key (k, r)), which is known only by the DO and client, is used for computing
hashVal of the vertices and edges. Therefore, if adversary A can compute vo-g0,
vo-out0 so that G0  can be verified against gh, then either adversary A is aware
of r or adversary A has been able to find a pre-image attack on H. The former
contradicts our assumption that (k, r) is secret and known only to the DO
and client and is not available to SP including any other entities. The latter
contradicts our assumption thatH is a random oracle, and thus proves the point
that label, contents, or edges cannot be modified by adversary A including the
semi-honest service provider SP .
• Deletion of vertices and edges: Lemma 4.5.1 applies to deletion of vertices
and edges by adversary A other than the SP that is authorized to carry out
such operations4. Thus the proof follows.
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Table 4.1.: Di↵erent graph datasets
Graph |V| |E| Description
email-Enron 265, 214 418, 956 Email communication network from Enron
web-NotreDame 325, 729 1, 469, 679 Web graph of Notre Dame
amazon0601 403, 394 3, 387, 388 Amazon product co-purchasing network
from June 1, 2003
web-Google 875, 713 5, 105, 039 Web graph from Google
wiki-Talk 2, 394, 385 5, 021, 410 Wikipedia talk (communication) network
4.6 Performance Analysis
4.6.1 Complexity Analysis
The complexity of the HMAC scheme for graph datasets (Section 4.3) is linear
with request to number of nodes and edges in the input graph dataset for both gHMAC
(Algorithm 5) and gVrfy (Algorithm 6). Similarly, for redactable HMAC scheme for
graph datasets (Section 4.4), the complexity is also linear with request to number of
nodes and edges in the input graph dataset for rgHMAC (Algorithm 7) and rgHMAC
(Algorithm 8).
Algorithms 1, 2, 3, 4 perform a DFS traversal on the input graph, and at each visit
to a vertex carry out a constant amount of computation. Thus, their complexity is
O(|V |+ |E|), where |V | is the number of vertices, and |E| is the number of edges for
a graph G(V,E). The complexity of query result verification rgVrfy (Algorithm 9)
is O(|V | + |E |). The algorithm performs a DFS traversal on the redacted graph
G (V , E ), and at each visit to a vertex, it performs a constant amount of computa-
tion.
In essence, these schemes are optimal in terms of their complexity; they are linear
in the number of vertices and edges in the graph they process. It is apparent that a
sub-linear algorithm cannot process the graph in less than O(|V | + |E|) and cannot
4Under the redaction model as defined earlier in the paper, SP is authorized to carry out only
deletion of vertices and edges, and thus if the SP is an adversary A, then such deletion operations
on vertices and edges amount to be authorized operations.
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carry out integrity assurance of all the vertices and edges in a graph. Thus, a O(|V |+
|E|) complexity is the best complexity that an integrity assurance scheme for graphs
can achieve.
4.6.2 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we present detailed evaluation of results for the performance of the
proposed schemes. We provide two sets of results for two-party data publishing model:
i) computation of graph HMAC tag (gHMAC), and ii) verification of graph integrity
using HMAC tag (gVrfy) for graph HMAC-based scheme; and three di↵erent sets
of results for third-party data publishing model: i) computation of graph HMAC
tag (rgHMAC), ii) generation of query result R = G  and verification object VO
(gRedact), and iii) verifying the integrity of graph query result (rgVrfy) for redacted
graph HMAC-based scheme.
Experimental Setup
Running Platform: We have conducted all our experiments on Intel(R) Xeon(R)
CPU E5-2620 v3 2.40 GHz machine with 24 Cores and 188G byte RAM. All algo-
rithms have been implemented using Java 1.7. We used JGraphT-0.9.1 (a free Java
Graph Library)5 API as graph processing library. We provided JVM with the follow-
ing parameters:  Xms4G for min heap size and  Xmx8G for max heap size. Therefore,
we do not use all the available RAM.
Datasets: We have used real-world datasets available at Stanford Large Network
Dataset Collection6 for our experiments. Table 4.1 shows the specification of datasets.
The largest graph, wiki-Talk, has about 2M vertices and 5M edges.
Workload Generation: For our experiments, we use JGraphT library Subgraph
































Fig. 4.7.: gHMAC: Time to compute graph HMAC tag.
R = G (V , E ) = G(V,E) \ G0(V 0, E 0). The method public Subgraph(G base,
Set<V> vertexSubset, Set<E> edgeSubset) generates an induced subgraph given
a set of vertices and edges as input from a base graph represented as G.
Results for gHMAC
Computation time: Fig. 4.7 shows the time to compute HMAC tag as a func-
tion of number of nodes and edges in the input graph dataset. We observe that the
computation time increases as the size of input graph dataset increase. The com-
putation time involves determining the “local integrity verifier” xor-out(u) for all
the vertices and computing the ghash value recursively (as a vertex is finally visited
during a graph traversal) by concatenating the vertex hash value hashVal with the
previously computed ghash value.
Verification time: Fig. 4.8 shows the time to verify HMAC tag as a function
of number of nodes and edges in the input graph dataset. We observe that the
verification time increases as we increase the size of input graph. Similar to the





























Fig. 4.8.: gVrfy: Time to verify graph integrity using HMAC tag.
tag t0G. The computed tag value t
0
G is compared to the input tag value tG for integrity
verification.
We observe that the time in both the above graphs increases almost linearly, as
both the computation and verification algorithms use the function DFS-Visit(G, u)
to traverse a graph, which has a linear time complexity of O(V + E). However,
some spikes in the time curves can be explained as follow: The JGraphT library
Subgraph method generates an induced subgraph given a set of vertices (which are
selected randomly) as input from the original base graph G. The subgraphs can have
a new topology each time the Subgraph method is called for a given input size of
vertices. The spikes are the result of computations over subgraphs having more dense
neighborhoods and thus requiring more computation for determining “local integrity
verifiers” xor-out(u) for all the vertices and vice versa. For this reason, we average




















































Fig. 4.10.: gRedact: Time to compute query result R and verification object VO.
Results for rgHMAC
Computation time: In Fig. 4.9, we report the results for redacted graph HMAC
tag computation time versus the number of nodes and edges in the input graph



























Fig. 4.11.: rgVrfy: Time to verify the integrity of query result R.
time also increases. The algorithm rgHMAC computes the vertex and edge hash value
hashVal for all the vertices and edges and provides this to the third-party SP . More-
over, the algorithm computes the “local integrity verifier” out-xor(u) for all the ver-
tices and recursively computes the ghash value. ghash value is computed by taking
an exclusive-or   of the vertex hash value hashVal with the previously computed
ghash value in post-order.
Redaction time: In Fig. 4.10, we report the results for graph redaction versus
the size of graph G0 . We observe that, as we increase the graph G
0
  size, the time to
compute the query result or redacted graph R = G (V , E ) decreases. The reason
being for a large input graph G0  size, the corresponding redacted graph G  = G \G0 
is small. The redaction algorithm computes the vertex and edges hash value hashVal
for all vertices and edges in the query result R = G  and also determines two sets
of verification objects: vo-g and vo-out. The vo-g computation entails performing
exclusive-or   operation on the hash value hashVal of all the vertices in the set V \V .
These hash values need not be computed locally by algorithm gRedact, as they are
provided by the third-party SP as part of input. As the size of graph G  reduces, so
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does the size of set vo-out. The reason being a smaller number of descendant nodes are
present in V \V  for the parent vertices in the set V . This results in a reduced query
processing time for the algorithm and hence yields progressively decreasing time-slope
values. From Fig. 4.10, We notice that the relative di↵erence between time curves
for a given point on x-axis is in the order of largest to smallest graph dataset size
for all x-axis values. The reason being for a fixed G  size the corresponding graph
G0 = G \G  is larger for large graphs; thus, requiring the algorithm to perform more
computation of determine the sets vo-g and vo-out.
Verification time: Fig. 4.11 shows the time performance results for query result
integrity verification as a function of number of vertices and edges in the result graph
G . We observe that the verification time increases linearly as we increase the size
G . The verification time involves computing the hash value hashVal for all the
vertices in V  and edges E , which requires computing the “local integrity verifier”
out-xor(u) and using verification object vo-out during the hash value computation.
The complete ghash value is computed by taking an exclusive-or   of vo-g value with
the ghash value computed for the redacted graph G . Finally, for verification, the
algorithm compares the computed tag value t0G with the input tag tG value.
Comparison of rgHMAC with signature-based scheme
Figs. 4.12(a)-(c) show the comparison results for the proposed HMAC-based scheme
with the signature-based scheme [53] in terms of time associated with computation,
redaction (query result R and verification object VO generation), and query result
integrity verification. Notice HMAC-based scheme outperforms the signature-based
scheme by at least 4 times in terms of execution time for redaction and by at least 2
times in terms of execution time for integrity verification. Similarly, the HMAC-based
scheme is more than an order of magnitude faster in terms of execution time during
the computation stage. The reason being that the signature-based scheme uses i)
computationally expensive modular exponentiation that is a dominant cost factor in
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signing, redaction, and verification stages, and ii) computes secure names for keeping

























































Fig. 4.12.: Comparison with [53].
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4.7 Related Work
The problem of integrity verification of graph data and graph query result(s) is
an important problem that has been fueled by the growing applications of graph
datasets in a wide range of applications. However, integrity verification of graph data
and graph query results using HMACs has been studied for the first time in the paper.
Merkle hash trees (MHT) is one of the most widely used techniques [60] for in-
tegrity assurance of DAGs [61] and for query result verification [8]. In [56], the au-
thors define the formal security models of hashing schemes for graphs, and perfectly
collision-resistant hashing schemes for graphs. They proposed the first constructions
for general graphs that includes not only trees and graphs but also graphs with cycles
and forests. The schemes uses pre- and post-order numbers of vertices to convert
a cyclic graph into a two-level MHT (called e cient-tree). The proposed scheme is
linear in the number of vertices and edges in the graph dataset. A structure-based
routing scheme for XML-data dissemination to users under an access control policy is
presented in [62]. The scheme proposes the notion of encrypted post-order numbers
to support the integrity and confidentiality requirements of XML content. [63] pro-
poses an integrity assurance technique referred to as ‘structural signatures scheme’ for
trees in order to compute signatures of redactable subtrees. The scheme is based on
the structure of the tree as defined by tree traversals (pre-order, post-order, in-order)
and is defined using a randomized notion of such traversal numbers. With respect
to MHT, it incurs comparable cost for signing the trees and incurs lower cost for
user-side integrity verification. However, (1) a formal security model for the proposed
scheme is not given, and (2) it is quite expensive in terms of the number of signatures
computed, which are linear in the size of the tree/graph. [64] proposes a formal model
for the notion of structural signatures for trees and have given a construction for the
authentication of subtrees, which is linear in the number of nodes and quadratic in
the number of siblings per node.
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We have proposed two HMAC based data integrity verification schemes for graph
and redacted graphs; we give formal definitions and show our schemes are linear in
the number of vertices and edges in the graphs. [65] proposes two schemes on how
to authenticate DAGs and directed cyclic graphs without leaking, which are the first
such schemes in the literature. The schemes are based on the structure of graph as
defined by DFS traversals and aggregate signatures (Computational Di e-Hellman
problem). The schemes minimize the number of authentication units that a user must
receive in order to perform verification to O(1). The security of such schemes is based
on the security of cryptographic hash function (random oracles) and aggregate sig-
natures. [53] proposed a formal security model for leakage-free redactable signatures
(LFRS) that is general enough to address authentication of not only trees but also
graph and forests (disconnected trees/graphs). They also formally define the notion
of secure names, which felicitate verification of ordering between sibling/nodes. Their
proposed construction has linear complexity and outputs only one signature (optimal)
that is stored, transmitted and used for authentication of a tree, graph and forest.
[66] describe integrity and confidentiality preserving schemes for a DAG model of
provenance database. Digital signature are used to sign the nodes and the relation-
ships between them. An access control model based on paths on the provenance graph
is proposed to preserve confidentiality of the nodes and edges in the provenance graph
Fan et al. [8] present a framework for authentication of subgraph query services in out-
sourced graph databases. They propose an index Interaction-aware Feature-subgraph
Tree (IFTree) to minimize I/O cost associated with filtering-and-verification require-
ment for processing subgraph query. In addition, IFTree is extended to authenticate
subgraph query. The proposed extension is called MIFTree.
Digital signatures support not only integrity of data but also security properties
like authentication of data source and non-repudiation [54]. However, in many prac-
tical contexts, data protection requirements include only integrity verification of data
as other properties of digital signatures incur additional costs. To that end, MACs
have been developed for integrity verification as they have been shown to be more
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faster than RSA digital signatures [54]. There has been no wok on HMACs for graph
data and graph query result(s). Therefore, the focus of this paper is to develop the
notion of HMACs for graphs and graph query results. The proposed schemes exploit
the security properties of XOR operator (especially when applied a key (k, r), one-
way hash functions, and DFS traversal of graphs) in an e cient yet provable manner.
We provide formal definitions and constructions for the proposed schemes, and our
experimental results in Section 4.6 corroborate that our schemes are more e cient
than previously proposed digital signature-based schemes.
4.8 Summary
Graphs are used for representing and understanding objects and their relation-
ships for numerous applications. Graph databases are being used for managing sev-
eral types of linked data. Some leading examples include social networks, biological
networks, semantic Web, XML documents, and financial databases. However, the ex-
isting integrity assurance schemes for such data are neither scalable nor e cient – such
schemes for graph data are based on digital signature schemes. In this paper, we have
proposed two e cient integrity verification schemes – the first HMAC-based schemes
for graphs and query results for graphs. The schemes exploit the security properties
of   operator (especially when applied with a key (k, r), one-way hash functions, and
depth-first traversal of graphs) in an e cient yet provable manner. The schemes rely
on the local/global integrity verifiers of vertices and edges. The proposed schemes can
prove to satisfy the security requirement in terms of structural/attribute modification
to the graphs and redacted graphs. Our schemes are linear in the number of vertices
and edges in the graphs, i.e., they have optimal complexity. We compute one HMAC
value for gHMAC scheme and two other verification objects for redaction for rgHMAC
scheme that are shared with the verifier. Therefore, our scheme is e cient both in
processing time for query result and verification object transmission to the user. Our
experiments show that HMAC-based schemes are e cient as compared to the digital
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signature-based schemes for same size of graphs. Moreover, computing HMACs for
graphs as large as 8 million vertices and edges takes as little as 55 milliseconds.
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5. CONCLUSIONS
Section 5.1 summarizes the research contributions of this dissertation, Section 5.2
discusses the limitations of proposed methodologies, and and Section 5.3 proposes
directions for the future research work.
5.1 Summary of Contributions
This dissertation addresses two notable challenges for graph databases; i) how to
ensure users’ privacy in published graph data under access control policy enforcement,
and ii) how to verify the integrity and query results of graph datasets under both two-
party and third-party data distribution environments.
To address the first challenge, a graph data publishing framework has been pro-
posed that provides safeguard against data privacy breach through anonymization
while enforcing access rules to satisfy the security protection requirements specified
by the data publisher. We prove that the design of this framework poses a conflicting
goal between privacy and access control. We formulate the privacy and access con-
straints on graph data as the k-anonymous bi-objective graph partitioning (k-BGP)
problem. We show that the problem is NP-complete and provide new heuristic solu-
tions. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first scheme that studies the interplay
between RBAC policy constraints and privacy protection for graph data.
To address the second challenge, a cryptographic security model based on Hash
Message Authentication Codes (HMAC) has been proposed. The model ensures in-
tegrity and completeness verification of data and query results under both two-party
and third-party data distribution environments. Unique solutions based on HMACs
for integrity verification of graph datasets are developed and detailed security analy-
87
sis of the proposed schemes is provided. Extensive experimental evaluation has been
conducted to illustrate the performance of the proposed algorithms.
5.2 Limitations of the Proposed Methodologies
For the research presented in this dissertation, we have made several assumptions
regarding the database environment which in practical life may need to be overcome
in order to develop viable solutions for privacy, access control, and integrity for graph
databases. Some of the limitations and assumptions include the following: We have
made the assumption that the data graph model is static. However, this assumption
may not hold for several application areas as mentioned in Chapter 1. For example,
OSNs can change and evolve frequently over time. Such dynamic changes in graph
databases are not addressed in our research methodology.
The privacy-enhanced access control mechanism presented in Chapter 3 assumes
a relaxed access control policy. The interaction between privacy and strict access
control policy has not been addressed in our work.
For the integrity verification schemes for graph databases and query results pre-
sented in Chapter 4, we do not assume any access control mechanism and primarily
focus on integrity verification of problem. In reality access control mechanism is gen-
erally an added layer of security in addition to integrity verification system. The
interaction between integrity and access control methods has not been discussed in
this dissertation.
5.3 Future Work
Below we provide some directions for future work.
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5.3.1 A Privacy Mechanism for Access-Controlled Dynamic Graph Databases
In a dynamic scenario, the graph structure may need to be updated because of the
addition or removal of vertices and edges. Adding or removing new information while
simultaneously meeting the privacy and access control requirements is a challenge
that requires further research.
Employing a strict access control policy instead of a relaxed access control policy
for a shared role workload requires the dataset to be partitioned into two types of
groups: i) shared data region, and ii) non-shared data region. However, generating k-
anonymous partitions for both these groups separately requires developing intelligent
partitioning schemes to address corner cases due to non-uniform partitions being
generated. This is a challenge that requires further research.
5.3.2 Integrity Verification for Dynamic Graph Databases
In a dynamic scenario, the graph structure may need to be updated because of ad-
dition or removal of vertices and edges. Adding or removing new information requires
re-computing the integrity value for the updated graph database. Re-computing a
new integrity value by just considering the added or removed vertices and edges is
a challenge that requires further research. Moreover, the VO value may not remain
valid and drastically impact the security guarantees for updated query results. Re-
computing a new VO value by by just considering the added or removed vertices and
edges is a challenge that requires further research
The VO computation may not be possible under an access control policy enforce-
ment as a role is not able to see data beyond its privilege set.
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5.3.3 Aggregation-based Schemes for Graph Data Integrity
The integrity verification schemes for graph databases and query results presented
in Chapter 4 consider the whole graph for computing the integrity value. Computing
the integrity of an aggregated graph is a challenge that requires further research.
Our proposed integrity verification schemes have linear time complexity O(V +E).
Developing sub-linear time complexity algorithms for large graph databases that do
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A: Proof of Theorem 3.3.1
Proof of Theorem 3.3.1: To prove this theorem, we use Theorem 3.1 [38] and need to
first prove that Planer k-anonymous Graph Partitioning with Minimal ILS(P)(Planar
AGPMIL, for short) is NP-hard. The proof of Theorem 3.3.1 will follow as a direct
consequence of above two proofs.
First, we state that the AGPMIL is NP-hard in the plane, and then generalize
this result to the multidimensional Euclidean space.
PLANAR k-ANONYMOUS GRAPH PARTITIONINGWITH MINIMUM
ILS(P)(Planar AGPMIL)
INSTANCE: A planar graph G with a set X of n points/vertices in the plane; an
integer k, n > k.
QUESTION: Is there a clustering of X into a set of non-overlapping partitions
P = {P1, . . . , PM} such that |Pi|   k, and the structural information loss ILS(P)
minimal?
Our NP-completeness proof of (Planar AGPMIL) is based on reduction from the
following special version of the exact cover problem that is shown to be NP-complete
by Dyer and Frieze [67].
PLANAR EXACT COVER BY 3-SETS (Planar X3C)
INSTANCE:
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Consider a set Q of objects with |Q| = 3r. Let T ⇢ Q⇥Q⇥Q be a set of triplets
such that at most 3 triplets t 2 T can have a common object qi 2 Q. Such a mapping
between qi 2 Q and the triplet t 2 T to which it belongs to can form a bipartite
association. An additional requirement of such a bipartite graph G is that it must be
planer.
QUESTION: Does there exist such a bipartite association with a subset of r triples
in T that contain all the elements of Q?
Let Q = {q1, . . . , q3r} and T ⇢ Q ⇥ Q ⇥ Q be two sets of objects that constitute
an instance of planar X3C. We construct a point set X(Q, T ) composed of sets Q and
T such that the size of X is multiple of 3. This allows a grouping of points into a
partition set P = {P1, . . . , PM}, where |Pi|   k = 3 and ILS,1(P) is minimum if and
only if the planar X3C instance has a solution.
The reduction is based on calculating a rectilinear planar layout for bipartite graph
G. Given a planar graph G = (V,E), a rectilinear planar layout of G can be computed
in time polynomial in the size of G as reported in Rosenstiehl and Tarjan [68].
In the set X of points each point qi 2 Q is called an element point. A triple
triangle is formed by three constituent points of a triplet t = (t1, t2, t3) 2 T called
triple points. We place the elements and the triple triangles somewhere at the corre-
sponding line segments in the rectilinear layout. Our objective is establish a bipartite
connection between element points and triple points by using equilateral right triangle
 0 with sides of lengths 1, 1,
p
2. We assume that all points in X(Q, T ) are at integer
coordinates.
A chain of diamonds is used to connect element points qi 2 Q to triple points.
A triangular diamond contains two triangles that are glued together by their sides
of length 1. The chains of diamonds follow the line segments corresponding to the


























Fig. 1.: Partition into triangles di↵erent cases: (a) All graph vertices included in
shaded partitions, solution to X3C exists; (b) Some graph vertices not included in
shaded partitions, solution to X3C does not exist.
easily checked that this construction can be performed in polynomial time and |X| is
multiple of 3.
We assume that an enlarging procedure has been used on the rectilinear layout of
graph G by multiplying all coordinates with a large positive integer. This ensures
i) two distinct chains are generated su ciently away from each other, and ii) an
element point and its corresponding triple points can be connected exactly by a chain
of diamonds.
We now prove that the set of points X(Q, T ) can be partitioned into P =
{P1, . . . , PM}, such that |Pi|   k and the ILS,1(P) is minimum if and only if Planar
X3C problem has a solution.
Let us consider only partitions of size 3, 4 and 5 points. Fig. 2 shows di↵erent par-
tition configurations generated with size 3, 4 and 5 points. Due to space limitation, we
do not list any other possible groups. Fig. 2(a) states that no three points in X(Q, T )
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(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 2.: Partitions of size 3, 4 and 5 points.
are at a distance less that 1 and
p
2 from each other, so the minimum ILS,1(P) for a
partition with three vertices with three edges using 2|EPi |.
 
1   2|EPi |Pi(|Pi| 1)
 
= 0; Simi-
larly, for partitions of size 4, and 5 having 5 and 6 edges in Fig. 2(b) and Fig. 2(c),
respectively, the minimum ILS,1(P) can be calculated as 53 and
24
5 . Hence, it is easily
observed that the partitioning of point set X has the minimal ILS,1(Pi) = 0⇥ p = 0
if all partitions are of size 3, where p is determined by reconstruction.
Finally, we claim that the partitioning of point set X into triangles with minimum
intra-partition structural information loss ILS,1(P) is possible if and only if Planar
X3C has a solution.
(If) We assume that there exists a partitioning of points X(Q, T ) into triangles
with minimal ILS,1(P) = 0⇥ p = 0. Consider some element point qi 2 Q, contained
in exactly one partition (triangle) belonging to a chain of diamonds. Every other
triangle must form a partition, and the corresponding point ti on the other end of the
chain cannot be covered by any triangle in this chain. Therefore, the corresponding
three triple points must form another partition. However, the triangle(s) in the other
chain(s) going away from qi will cover the corresponding triple points, so these points
cannot form a partition in the partitioning. This way, we may assign to each qi 2 Q a
unique triple in T . On the other hand, if we assign one qi to some triple, the other two
elements in this triple must be assigned to this triple also. For the other paths that
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are excluded from qi; may be they contain qj that is not contained in any other triple.
But this case cannot happen because we have a partition with minimal information
loss, each qi is in one partition (Fig. 1(a)). Obviously, this yields a solution to Planar
X3C.
(Only if) We now assume that the Planar X3C has a solution T 0 ✓ T . We
construct a partitioning as follows. As a first step, each triple is mapped to a triple
triangle as a partition in the partitioning set, while on the other hand all triples in
T \T 0 are not. This uniquely determines which triangles in the chains are part of the
partitioning. Since T 0 is a solution of Planar X3C, every element point in X(Q, T ) is
exactly in one group.
Thus, it has been have shown that partitioning of X into partitions of three points
with minimum ILS,1(P) is possible if and only if Planar X3C problem has a solution.
Therefore, the partitioning of P with |Pi|   3 has minimum ILS,1(P) if and only if
Planar X3C problem allows a solution. This implies that the NP-complete problem
(Planar X3C) is not harder than partitioning a set of points X into partitions Pi, such
that |Pi|   3 and ILS,1(P) is minimum. Since ILS,1(P) is due to a restricted version
of the problem (i.e., where we do not consider the inter-partition edges, |EPi,Pj | =  
) and this restricted version of problem contains a known NP-complete problem as a
special case therefore, Planar AGPMIL is NP-hard in a plane.
We can now easily extend the results to show that a partitioning ofX(Q, T ) points
into partitions Pi with |Pi|   3 with minimum ILS(P) is NP-hard in a the Euclidean
space with dimensions   2.
The proof of Theorem 3.3.1 now follows directly from the above theorem and
Theorem 3.1 [38]. Zahid et al. [38] prove that finding k-anonymous partitioning
with imprecision bounds is NP-complete. We have shown that k-anonymous graph
partitioning with minimum ILS(P) is NP-complete. Therefore, the decisional k-BGP
problem is NP-complete with either or both constraints.
Example 8 Suppose Q = {q1, q2, q3, q4, q5, q6} and C = {{q1, q2, q3}, {q4, q5, q6}, {q1, q5, q6}}.
The solution to PX3C instance consists of {{q1, q2, q3}, {q4, q5, q6}} since these two 3-
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element sets provide an exact cover for Q. It can be noticed from the construction in
Fig. 1(a), the solution shown by shaded triangles is the only solution to the AGPMIL
problem.
If we attempt to construct some other partition of the induced graph into disjoint
triangles (e.g., Fig. 1(b)), we end up with one or more of the q0is 2 {q1, q2, q3, q4, q5, q6}
not being included in any of the shaded triangles. In other words, we do not generate
a partition with desired properties. It can be noticed from Fig. 1(b), that vertices
{q2, q3, q4} are not included in any partition.
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B: Proof of Theorem 3.5.1
Proof We assume that the adversary A has both the structural and attribute infor-
mation as background knowledge for re-identification of a target node x. Suppose the
adversary A executes a structural query QS(x) [69] to determine the set of feasible
candidate partitions candQS(x). With no other information, the adversary A then
may choose any partition y 2 candQS(x) arbitrarily. The probability of a particular





In addition, as mentioned above, the adversary A may also have some attribute
Attr ✓ {QI1, . . . , QId} information as background knowledge for the target node x.
Given a set N of d-dimensional data points enclosed in a volume Uvol =
Qd
i=1[Ui],
where [Umini , U
max
i ] is the range of domain in dimension i, the proposed algorithms
partition the data space into |P| hyper-rectangles as a result of k-anonymous par-
titioning. The adversary A may then execute a query QA to determine the fea-
sible candidate partitions candA(x). The query QA can be considered as forming





Uvol, Li = [Lmini , L
max
i ]. The size of the set candQA(x) can be determined by com-







according to [70], where Sj is the average length
of projections of all partitions Pj 2 P along dimensions j and Lj and Uj are the
corresponding projections for query QA and total domain space Uvol along dimen-






, where the product term, also known as the Minkowski sum,
determines the selectivity of the query QA. It is quite intuitive that increasing the
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dimension or the number of attributes of query QA has the e↵ect of reducing the size









Similarly, the adversary A may first execute the query QA on P set to deter-












The disclosure-risk of a node x depends on the size of the set |cand(x)| and the
likelihood of candidates. The exact re-identification of a target node x by an adversary
A requires the identification of a single candidate partition y 2 candQ(x).
Therefore, combining equations (2) and (3), the probability of a candidate y 2






As the total number of candidate nodes per partition is k, the probability of




Therefore, combining Equations (4) and (5) the probability of re-identifying a
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